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ABSTRACT 
 
Inflation targeting (IT), in simplistic terms, is a monetary policy regime that is based upon the 
commitment of a country’s monetary authority to meeting predetermined, quantitative targets 
for the annual rate of inflation. IT has attained popularity and widespread acclamation 
amongst policymakers in the international context over the past three decades. Since Egypt 
initiated a new economic and structural reform program supported by the Extended Fund 
Facility from the IMF in November 2016, the search for a new nominal anchor for the 
Egyptian economy has been underway. In this regard, the new objective seems to be a 
temporary switch to a monetary targeting regime in the short run, while moving towards the 
implementation of a full-fledged IT regime in the medium term. Against this background, the 
Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) recently released a draft law indicating its desire to transition 
towards IT. This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Egypt is ready for the 
implementation of IT. I propose a twofold methodology based on an assessment of the 
institutional and technical framework currently in place in Egypt, combined with a 
comprehensive survey of the current international practices of 28 inflation-targeting countries 
to determine whether or not the Egyptian framework is adequate in meeting the basic 
preconditions for IT, and to identify the practical considerations that need to be taken into 
account if the CBE indeed decides to adopt an inflation targeting regime in the near future. 
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting, in simplistic terms, is a monetary policy regime that is 
based upon the commitment of a country’s monetary authority to meeting 
predetermined, quantitative targets for the annual rate of inflation. Inflation targeting 
(IT) has attained popularity and widespread acclamation amongst policymakers in the 
international context over the past three decades. Ever since the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand pioneered the new monetary policy regime when it historically became the 
first central bank to officially set and commit to an explicit quantitative inflation 
target in 1990, IT has attracted the attention of central banks around the world. The 
attractiveness of inflation targeting has not been limited to developed countries; many 
emerging market economies were quick to make the transition to an inflation 
targeting regime, and the number of developing countries adopting IT seems to be on 
the rise. Egypt is no exception to this phenomenon. Talks of an IT monetary policy 
regime in Egypt have been in the works since 2005 (Al-mashat, 2008), but it was only 
recently that the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) released a draft law that is currently 
under review by Parliament in which it formally declared its intention to officially 
transition towards a full fledged IT regime. The proposed draft law comes in 
conjunction with the new economic and structural reform program that Egypt initiated 
in November 2016 supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) from the IMF. One 
of the major objectives of the IMF program is the transition to a fully-fledged IT 
regime in the medium term. 
In defining the main characteristics of an IT regime, Mishkin (1999) lists the 
defining features of inflation targeting as follows: 
• the setting, and public announcement of quantitative, specific targets 
for inflation that are to be met within a specific time horizon,  
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• an official commitment on the part of the country’s monetary authority 
to price stability as its overriding objective,  
• less emphasis on intermediary targets such as money growth, 
• more transparent policy-making on the part of the central bank,  
• and a high degree of accountability of the central bank towards 
meeting its announced policy objectives. 
It is also important to understand an inflation-targeting regime in the context 
of other monetary policy regimes. The four major monetary policy regimes practiced 
currently by central banks globally are (1) exchange rate targeting, (2) monetary 
targeting, (3) inflation targeting, and (4) monetary policy with an implicit nominal 
anchor (but not an explicit one). Exchange rate targeting involves fixing the value of 
the practicing country’s domestic currency to that of a large, low inflation country. 
Monetary targeting, which is the monetary policy regime currently in place in Egypt, 
revolves around stabilizing price levels through an intermediary target, namely, 
money growth. In doing so, the central bank targets inflation indirectly, which is the 
major difference between monetary targeting and inflation targeting. Implicit nominal 
anchor targeting involves the central bank committing to an implied nominal anchor 
without explicitly announcing it. The most prominent example of the use of this type 
of strategy is the Federal Reserve, which has, for many years, pursued an implicit 
nominal anchor exemplified in the overriding concern by the Federal Reserve to keep 
inflation low and stable without explicitly pursuing an IT regime.  
Inflation targeting is the youngest of the four regimes, meaning it has the 
shortest history and track record. Nonetheless, after the New Zealand experience in 
introducing inflation targeting proved successful in achieving its objectives (Sherwin, 
1999), Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia were early followers in the 
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adoption of an IT framework, all enacting a formal IT framework in 1991, 1992, and 
1993 respectively (Roger, 2010). Despite it being a relatively demanding regime, 
inflation targeting was also adopted by a number of emerging countries, with Brazil 
and Chile being the first two emerging economies to formally enact inflation targeting 
in 1999. Since then, IT has been officially adopted by almost 30 countries, with a 
number of countries attempting a transition toward it.  
The question then becomes: if IT has exhibited such widespread success in 
numerous developed and emerging economies alike, what motivation there is to study 
the viability of IT in Egypt? The fact of the matter is that despite its success, IT has 
not been immune to a fair share of criticism. Indeed, especially for the case of a 
developing country such as Egypt, one must take into consideration the demanding 
nature of the IT framework compared to other monetary regimes: an extremely high 
degree of central bank independence and accountability, the absence of fiscal 
dominance, having a sound financial system as well as a deeply banked economy are 
just some of the many institutional prerequisites needed for a successful 
implementation of IT. A near impeccable understanding of transmission mechanisms 
of monetary policy and a solid capacity to accurately forecast inflation are some of 
the technical prerequisites that are needed (Youssef, 2007).  
The motivation for this research is two-fold. Firstly, since the global financial 
crisis of 2008, the global debate around the validity of a strict IT regime has 
intensified, so much so that some economists have asserted, “inflation targeting died 
when the Lehman Brothers died” (Reichlin & Baldwin, 2013). Many economists and 
policymakers have questioned the ability of IT to stabilize economies after the 
significant downturn of the U.S. economy during the crisis, despite its low inflation 
levels. Some have argued that IT, in its strict form, hinders the capability of central 
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banks to address other important macroeconomic outcomes such as growth and 
employment (Woodford, 2012). Hence, the first, somewhat peripheral, motivation for 
this research is to contribute to the global dialogue on IT. 
The second, more focal, motivation is the relevance of the topic to the 
Egyptian economy today. Since Egypt initiated a new economic and structural reform 
program supported by the Extended Fund Facility from the IMF in November 2016 - 
which encompassed the floatation of the exchange rate as one of the major reforms 
required - the search for a new nominal anchor has been underway. In this regard, the 
new objective seems to be a temporary switch to a monetary targeting regime in the 
short run, while moving towards the implementation of a full-fledged IT regime in the 
medium term. In order to achieve this objective, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), 
released a draft law indicating its desire to transition towards IT. The draft law is 
currently undergoing review by the Egyptian Parliament.  Despite the fact that the 
CBE claims to have been working towards a transition to IT since 2005, the new draft 
law will be the first official, explicit announcement indicating the movement towards 
a formal adoption of IT in Egypt. National media outlets have since been extremely 
active in stirring up controversy about the CBE draft law as a whole, and in particular 
about article 19, which explicitly stipulates the adoption of an IT monetary policy 
regime (Abdelrazek, 2017; Moustafa, 2017). This research, is hence motivated by the 
desire to develop a solid ground on which to build a case on whether or not Egypt is 
prepared for the adoption of an IT regime.  
The objectives of the research are contemplated as follows: 
• Gauge the implications of IT for small, open, developing economies like 
Egypt; 
 11 
• Determine whether IT is the best monetary policy for Egypt under the current 
circumstances, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of IT in 
relation to its alternatives; 
• Examine in detail the basic technical and institutional framework required for 
adoption of an IT regime; 
• Assess thoroughly and comprehensively the country experiences with IT to 
determine how an IT regime can be tailored to the specific case of Egypt; 
• Evaluate Egypt’s situation in terms of its progress in preparing the economy 
for IT adoption and pinpointing the potential implementation challenges; 
• Provide recommendations regarding steps that can be taken to better prepare 
Egypt for IT 
A twofold methodology is employed based on an assessment of the 
institutional and technical framework currently in place in Egypt, combined with a 
comprehensive survey of the current international practices of 28 inflation-targeting 
countries to determine whether or not the Egyptian framework is adequate in meeting 
the basic preconditions for IT, and to identify the practical considerations that need to 
be taken into account if the CBE indeed decides to adopt an inflation targeting regime 
in the near future. Thus, this paper aims to objectively evaluate the research question 
of whether or not Egypt is ready to adopt a fully-fledged IT regime. In answering this 
question through the research, this study looks into country experiences with IT, 
focusing on the implications of IT for developing economies like Egypt. It also 
intends to dissect in detail the basic technical and institutional preconditions necessary 
for IT and the degree to which they are fulfilled in Egypt. Finally, it intends to look 
into what steps can be taken to better prepare Egypt for IT if indeed that is the path 
the central bank intends to take in the near future. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Conceptual Framework of Inflation Targeting 
2.1.1 Monetary Policy Regimes in the Context of the Rules vs. Discretion Debate 
 
In studying the conceptual framework of IT, it is important to first look into 
the roots of monetary policy as a whole. Indeed, IT as a framework for monetary 
policy, like all other monetary policy frameworks, was developed as a means to an 
end. Ultimately, the goal of monetary policy as a part of overall macroeconomic 
policy is to contribute to the growth of the economy through price stability (Friedman, 
1968). The importance of price stability as the overriding objective of monetary 
policy became even more pronounced starting in the 1990’s, a period commonly 
known as “the low inflation era”. This period, also known as “The Great Moderation" 
was distinguished as a period in which low and stable inflation and moderate growth 
rates were registered in most advanced economies (Poloz, 2015). The objective of 
price stability is in its simplest form defined as the achievement and maintenance of 
low, stable levels of inflation (Svensson, 2000). Price stability is essential to 
economic growth because it reduces uncertainty and allows for efficient allocation of 
productive resources without the distortive effect of inflation on economic agents’ 
decision making. Additionally, price stability mitigates the adverse impact that high 
inflation has on the poorest sectors of society, since inflation contributes to unfair 
redistribution of income and wealth (White, 2006). 
In their attempts to achieve price stability, central banks have historically 
resorted to different intermediate targets to aid in the attainment of their final goal. 
This is where the concept of a nominal anchor enters the discussion. In simplistic 
terms, a nominal anchor is a tool used by a country’s monetary authority to contain 
the price level within that country (Mishkin, 1999). In essence, the ultimate objective 
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of a monetary policy framework is to provide a nominal anchor to the economy. The 
literature shows that there are four main nominal anchors, namely, exchange rate 
targeting, monetary targeting, implicit nominal anchor targeting, and most recently, 
inflation targeting.  
But before delving into an extensive explanation of the three nominal anchor 
frameworks, the theoretical background of monetary policy encompassed in what is 
known as the rules vs. discretion debate on monetary policy needs to be explained.  
The rules vs. discretion debate is one of the longest-standing debates in the 
history of monetary policy. It focuses on the relative benefits and costs of designing 
and implementing monetary policy such that central banks adhere to stringent, 
predetermined rules, as opposed to allowing them flexibility and placing more 
emphasis on subjective judgment in responding to macroeconomic shocks as they 
arise (Van Lear, 2000).  
The major argument for rule-based monetary policy proclaims that, when 
there are no set rules, governments can influence decision-making of central banks in 
order to achieve short-term goals that are inconsistent with the ultimate goal of price 
stability. For example, in order to keep unemployment rates low, governments may 
push inflation up above its natural level (Barro & Gordon, 1983). This gave rise to the 
“time inconsistency model”, the underlying theory of why central bank credibility 
gains associated with a rule-based framework are important for achieving price 
stability. The time inconsistency model, which was first introduced by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and later extended by Barro and Gordon (1983), contends that the 
government suffers from inflationary bias that results in suboptimum inflation 
outcomes; that is, actual inflation is consistently higher than the optimal level.  
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While rule-based policymaking may be advantageous in mitigating the effects 
of time inconsistency, proponents of discretionary policy argue that sticking to a 
predetermined set of rules does not allow central banks enough flexibility to respond 
quickly to unforeseen changes in the macroeconomic environment, thereby limiting 
their capacity to ameliorate the effects of sudden, unexpected shocks to the economy.  
Fischer (1989) notes that the concept of rules vs. discretion in monetary policy 
should be contemplated as a continuum rather than two distinct extremes. Where a 
monetary policy framework lies on this continuum depends on the degree of 
autonomy of the central bank, how strictly defined its objectives are, and the strength 
of the relationship between its policy decisions and the achievement of those 
objectives.  
2.1.2 Alternatives to Inflation Targeting 
In practice, no monetary policy regime can be classified as exclusively 
belonging to either extreme. To better grasp the conceptual background of inflation 
targeting, it is important to first understand the theoretical advantages and limitations 
of its major predecessors: exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, and monetary 
policy with an implicit, but not explicit nominal anchor. 
Exchange rate targeting (ERT), which involves tying the domestic currency to 
that of another foreign currency or basket of currencies, or to a commodity (such as 
gold) has been in practice by central banks since the introduction of the gold standard 
in 1870 (Cooper, 1999). Based on its defining characteristics, ERT could be placed 
towards the rule side of the rule vs. discretion continuum. Thus, discretion in 
monetary policy is almost non-existent under ERT, virtually eliminating the problem 
of time inconsistency. This constitutes the major advantage of ERT. An exchange rate 
target is also simple and easy for the public to understand. However, as history has 
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shown, ERT has a fatal disadvantage in that it entails a loss of independent monetary 
policy for the practicing country (Mishkin, 1999). Indeed, the impossible trinity of 
monetary policy indicates that tying the domestic exchange rate to that of another 
economy in the case of an open economy with free capital flows automatically entails 
the sacrifice of the central bank’s ability to conduct autonomous monetary policy 
(Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998). The central bank’s policies become directly tied to those 
of its anchor country, even when almost certainly, each of them will face different 
economic conditions and business cycles. The asymmetric shock phenomenon entails 
that not only will the targeting economy’s central bank lose the ability to respond to 
domestic shocks, but the anchor economy’s shocks are also transmitted to the 
targeting economy (Mishkin, 1999). Additionally, ERT puts countries at risk of 
speculative attacks on their currency (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995). Accountability of the 
central bank is also not pronounced since the central bank has limited capacity to 
make operational decisions with regards to monetary policy. 
 In response to the limitations posed by exchange rate targeting, another 
monetary policy regime known as monetary targeting (MT) came into practice. 
Monetary targeting involves targeting price stability through an intermediary target, 
namely, money aggregates (Neupauerová & Vravec, 2007). Under an MT framework, 
the monetary authority steers policy decisions towards controlling monetary 
aggregates, led by the conviction that these aggregates are the main driver of inflation 
over in the long run. Thus, while an explicit inflation target is not announced, and 
central bank intervention is focused largely in the money market. 
 The most important advantage that monetary targeting presents over ERT is that 
it allows central banks to conduct monetary policy independent from an “anchor 
country” to respond to domestic considerations. Additionally, monetary targeting 
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implicitly entails having a floating exchange rate in theory, which acts as a shock 
absorber that insulates the domestic economy from foreign shocks (Senay & 
Sutherland, 2007). Since money supply is controlled by the central bank itself, 
another advantage is that the central bank can easily measure and observe the money 
aggregates that it targets. This ease of observability and measurability of monetary 
targets means that real-time information about whether the central bank is achieving 
its target is easily accessible. Albeit, the major drawback of using an intermediary 
target (money aggregates) to achieve an ultimate end goal (price stability) is that it 
mandates the existence of a consistently strong and stable relationship between the 
two. If the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation is unpredictable or 
weak, it becomes nearly impossible to apply monetary targeting successfully, and the 
credibility of the central bank suffers as a result, casting doubt on the viability of 
monetary targeting to serve as an effective system to enhance central bank 
accountability and transparency (Estrella & Mishkin, 1997). This is an especially 
relevant issue for developing countries. Nevertheless, it follows that monetary 
targeting is more discretionary than it is rule-based since the central bank targets an 
intermediary target of monetary aggregates, which are under the direct control of the 
central bank itself (Mishkin, 1999).  
The final monetary policy regime that is often overlooked in theory but remains 
very much present in practice is the use of an implicit nominal anchor rather than an 
explicit one. The most prominent example of the use of this type of strategy is the 
Federal Reserve, which has, for many years, pursued an implicit nominal anchor 
exemplified in the overriding concern by the Federal Reserve to keep inflation low 
and stable without explicitly pursuing an inflation targeting regime (Mishkin, 1999). 
This strategy, dubbed the “just do it” strategy by Mishkin, puts significant weight on 
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the subjective judgment and decision making abilities of the Board members of the 
Central Bank. Due to the long lags that exist between the time monetary policy 
decisions are made and when their impact on inflation is realized, this monetary 
policy regime emphasizes the need for forward-looking, preemptive policy making 
that forecasts and takes measures to control inflation before its signs begin to show on 
the economy. Monetary policy with an implicit but not explicit nominal anchor has 
proven its propensity to succeed as demonstrated by the Federal Reserve of the United 
States. Since 1991, the Fed has been successful in keeping inflation low and stable, 
registering positive inflation rates below 3.5% consistently with the exception of the 
year 2008, during which inflation peaked at 3.8%, and a negative inflation rate of -
0.4% the following year due to the global financial crisis (World Bank). Despite the 
aforementioned success, the lack of an explicit official nominal anchor inevitably 
takes a toll on the transparency of the Central Bank and its tendency to communicate 
with the public. This major disadvantage becomes especially critical when 
considering the case of developing countries, where credibility of the central bank is 
often not backed by a strong track record to begin with. Additionally, the fact that the 
central bank becomes accountable to the general public to a lesser degree entails that 
it is more likely to succumb to political pressure, and thus more likely to fall into the 
time-inconsistency problem. 
2.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Inflation Targeting 
 With the aforementioned relationship between money aggregates and inflation 
starting to break down in countries practicing monetary targeting such as Canada, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom to name a few, the first seeds of inflation 
targeting were sown in New Zealand in 1990 (Mishkin, 1999). An IT regime is 
characterized by five defining features: 1) the setting of quantitative, specific targets 
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for inflation that are to be met within a specific time horizon, and the public 
announcement of these targets, (2) an official commitment on the part of the monetary 
authority to price stability as its overriding objective, and its superiority over any 
other objectives, (3) less emphasis on intermediary targets such as money growth, (4) 
increased communication with the public regarding monetary policy, which mandates 
increased transparency and (5) augmented accountability of the monetary authority to 
the general public. Under these features, the central bank should have enough 
freedom to use monetary policy tools to achieve its end goal of price stability. Thus, 
the concept of defining IT as a framework of “constrained discretion” was introduced 
by Bernanke in 1997 (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997).  
The classification of IT as constrained discretion is fitting, since it is a 
framework that incorporates both rule-based elements, through the announcement and 
commitment to an explicit numerical inflation target, and discretionary elements 
embodied in the operational freedom of the central bank to make monetary policy 
decisions as it sees fitting in order to achieve that target (Jahan, 2017).  
The strongest advantage of IT is that it circumvents the drawbacks of its 
predecessors. First of all, like monetary targeting, IT necessarily entails that the 
country must have a floating exchange rate to enable the central bank to conduct 
monetary policy independently, and so the issue of asymmetric shocks inherent in 
exchange rate targeting is avoided and there is capacity to respond to domestic 
shocks. Additionally, targeting inflation itself as the end goal of monetary targeting 
rather than an intermediary target of money aggregates decreases the monetary policy 
regime’s reliance on the existence of a strong relationship between the two. By 
providing an explicit numerical target for inflation, IT also provides the benefit of a 
rule-based framework in that avoids the time inconsistency problem (Bean, 2016). 
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Inherent in IT is also increased transparency and accountability of the central bank for 
attaining the announced inflation objective. Inflation figures are also more easily 
perceived and understood by the general public than are monetary targets. Advocates 
of IT claim that a major benefit of IT is increased ability of the central bank to reduce 
inflation levels and inflation volatility, without adversely impacting output (Ayres, 
Belasen, & Kutan, 2014). 
IT, however, is not without its limitations, especially if it is practiced with too 
much emphasis on strict and literal rules. It has been argued that inflation-targeting 
central banks that place too much weight on reaching preset inflation goals implicitly 
ignore other important macroeconomic variables such as output, employment and the 
exchange rate, which results in poor outcomes for these variables (Libich, 2011). 
Sacrifices in output may also be magnified during disinflation if economic agents do 
not trust the credibility of the central bank to achieve its mandate of low and stable 
inflation (Jonsson, 1999). The global financial crisis of 2008 also shed light on the 
shortcomings of IT. While some may argue that the minimal effect that the global 
crisis of 2008 had on inflation rates despite it being one of the largest economic 
shocks in recent memory reflects the success of IT, others concur the 2008 crisis only 
highlights its disadvantages. Even though inflation targeting countries were generally 
able to keep inflation rates around the target, they were plagued with an economic 
slowdown that pulled growth rates down to plummeting levels and left countless 
people unemployed, thereby bringing up the notion that IT could in fact be “a victim 
of its own success” (Gillitzer & Simon, 2015). Critics of IT thus argue that too much 
focus on inflation as a sole mandate is detrimental to the economy as a 
whole. Another issue with IT is that it is a heavily demanding framework that 
comprises several prerequisites for successful implementation. This in itself is 
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disadvantageous, because it limits the scope of countries that are eligible to adopt IT 
to those countries that satisfy most of these prerequisites.  
2.1.4 Prerequisites for Inflation Targeting 
One of the most well documented disadvantages of IT is its demanding and 
unforgiving nature as a monetary policy regime in terms of the prerequisites that are 
purported in the theoretical literature to be crucial for its proper implementation 
(Eichengreen, Masson, Savastano, & Sharma, 1999). A thorough understanding of 
these prerequisites (which are generally categorized into institutional and technical 
prerequisites) is critical in order to completely assimilate the conceptual framework 
underlying in IT. It should be noted that satisfying some of these preconditions 
(especially institutional conditions, such as Central Bank independence), is important 
for the successful conduct of monetary policy in general under any monetary policy 
regime. However, the weight placed on satisfying these preconditions is even more 
pronounced under IT, as a result of its heavier reliance on the role of Central Bank 
transparency and credibility in the formulation of inflation expectations (Masson, 
Savastano, & Sharma, 1997).  
Institutional Prerequisites 
• Independence of the Central Bank 
Independence of the central bank is the cornerstone, and likely the most 
important institutional prerequisite for the implementation of IT. This prompts an 
important discussion about the distinction between instrument and goal independence 
and whether or not both are conducive to an IT regime. Goal independence implies 
that the Central Bank would have complete autonomy in setting the inflation target 
that it will work towards itself, while instrument independence, or operational 
independence, implies that the Central Bank would have the discretion to conduct 
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monetary policy towards achieving the target, without necessarily being a part of the 
decision making process in setting it.  As the monetary authority in the economy, the 
central bank should have complete operational independence in setting monetary 
policy instruments to achieve the preset inflation target, implying a separation of 
authority between fiscal and monetary institutions and allowing the Central Bank to 
focus on its primary mandate of achieving low and stable inflation (Sims, 2016). This 
implies that the central bank should not be subject to any form of political pressure 
from the country’s fiscal authority on monetary policy decision making under IT 
(Ćorić, 2007), and that the central bank should have enough autonomy to be entirely 
focused on achieving its ultimate goal of price stability (Youssef, 2007). For example, 
the organizational structure board of directors (or the entity responsible for setting 
monetary policy instruments) should be assembled in a way that eliminates political 
pressure.  
• Absence of Other Nominal Anchors 
IT also requires, in theory, the absence of other nominal anchors and a 
willingness on the part of the central bank to commit to price stability as the 
overarching goal of monetary policy (A Mishra & Mishra, 2009).  
• High Degree of Transparency and Accountability  
In compliance with the high level of independence granted to the central bank, 
an amplified degree of accountability is required. Under IT, there is a need to set in 
place transparency and accountability measures to enhance the credibility of the 
central bank and ultimately, the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
• Fiscal Consolidation, and Lack of Fiscal Dominance 
Fiscal consolidation (which refers to the lack of large, persistent fiscal deficits 
and government debts) and the absence of fiscal dominance (which refers to a 
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situation where fiscal authorities have power to intervene in monetary policy 
decisions to maintain government solvency in a manner that is detrimental to the 
ultimate goal of monetary policy) are also critical conditions for the assurance of 
central bank independence, and thus success in IT (Woodford, 2001). Under fiscal 
dominance, the financial needs of the government overshadow the conduct of 
independent monetary policy (Khan, 2003). When the government has enough 
influence on monetary decision-making, it can exert pressure on the central bank to 
monetize a part of its deficit through printing money (also known as seigniorage 
revenue), which in turn has an inflationary impact on the economy that is 
counterproductive to IT (Kumhof, Nunes, & Yakadina, 2010). 
Technical Prerequisites 
• The need to construct a suitable price index for measurement of the inflation 
target and progress made towards its attainment constitutes an important technical 
prerequisite for IT (Silver, 2006; Vredin, 2015).  
• Technical capabilities of the central bank to make use of all available data in a 
forward-looking manner to construct accurate and timely inflation forecasts (and 
analysis of potential scenarios) is necessary for the adoption of IT (Duman, 2002).  
• In order for IT to work, there must be a strong and reliable transmission 
mechanism that links between monetary policy instruments that are in the direct 
control of the central bank, and the goal of inflation. This requires the existence of 
a deep, stable financial system and sophisticated credit markets that allow for tools 
such as the interest rate to have predictable effects on inflation (Carare et al , 2002; 
Laurens et al, 2014). 
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2.2 Empirical Literature on Inflation Targeting 
Relevant empirical studies on IT can be categorized around two main areas of 
focus: the results and effectiveness of IT as measured by its impact on different 
macroeconomic variables, and how necessary the satisfaction of preconditions of IT is 
to its success in practicing countries. Since the first pioneers of inflation targeting 
were developed, industrialized countries, most of the research pertaining to the 
evaluation of the results of IT and its impact on macroeconomic parameters is focused 
on those developed countries that have had the longest history with the framework. 
On the other hand, emerging and developing countries are more often utilized for 
research related to the effect of meeting the prerequisites of IT, since many of the IT-
practicing emerging and developing countries lacked some (if not most) of the 
theoretically proposed preconditions for IT when it was first introduced  
2.2.1 Empirical Literature on the Results and Effectiveness of IT 
Empirical studies on the results of IT include studying the effect of IT and 
macroeconomic variables such as the level of inflation, inflation volatility, output 
growth, output gap variability, the sacrifice ratio (the cost of bringing down inflation), 
the exchange rate, and current account balances, to name a few. In general, it is 
thought that bringing inflation down, while central to the proper functioning of an 
economy, is quite costly in terms of its impact on other macroeconomic variables 
such as output growth and employment (Ball, 1994).  
A large body of research has been employed to test the effect of IT on 
inflation levels and volatility. Much of this research has concluded that inflation 
levels have dropped significantly in the years after the adoption of an IT regime in 
most countries. For example, Pétursson (2004) concluded that the first six countries 
adopting IT exhibited a drop in inflation rates from an average of 9% in the five years 
prior to adoption of IT to 3.5% in the year after adoption. More generally, for 21 
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countries that were classified officially as IT’ers in 2004, the inflation rate dropped 
from an average of 31% in the 5 years prior to adoption of IT to 4.5% the year after 
its adoption. Neumann & Hagen (2002) compared six inflation-targeting countries 
and three non-targeting countries across two sample periods (a pre-IT period and a 
post-IT period). The authors conclude that inflation targeting countries achieved 
lower levels of inflation and inflation and interest rate volatility as a result of central 
bank credibility gains associated with committing to inflation targets. C. E S 
Gonçalves & Salles (2008) found that for a sample of 36 economies (including 13 
with an explicit IT regime in place), the countries with IT achieved statistically and 
economically significant reductions in inflation levels and inflation volatility when 
compared to countries that employed other monetary policy regimes. Applying the 
propensity scoring method to a sample of 109 potential inflation-targeting countries, 
Vega and Winkelried (2005) find that significantly lower inflation levels and 
volatility are achieved when IT is adopted. Valera, Holmes and Hassan (2017) 
employ a GARCH model and find that for eight Asian economies, IT has a significant 
effect on lowering inflation rates but its the effect is not significant on lowering 
inflation volatility. 
While the aforementioned evidence supporting the success of IT in bringing 
down inflation levels and volatility may seem convincing and ample, not much 
supplementary investigation is needed to demonstrate that a comparable amount of 
evidence exists that suggests the contrary. Indeed, many researchers have questioned 
whether the association between the drop in average inflation rates and IT is one of 
causality, or merely correlation. Debelle et al (1999) critically scrutinize the purported 
success of IT, arguing that non-inflation targeting economies experienced similar 
reductions in inflation levels and volatility during the 1990’s, which points to the 
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proposition that the 1990s represented a period with conditions conducive to inflation 
reduction in general, regardless of whether countries employed an IT regime or not. 
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), who also find that inflation rates were reduced by the 
23 countries surveyed in the 1990’s relative to the 1980’s regardless of the level of 
development, geography, or whether or not an inflation-targeting regime was in place, 
reached a similar conclusion. Honda (2000) finds that the adoption of IT had no 
significant impact on the reduction of inflation levels and volatility for New Zealand, 
Canada, and Australia, three of the pioneering economies in IT. Similarly, Lin and Ye 
(2007) use a propensity scoring method to evaluate the treatment effect of IT adoption 
on inflation levels and volatility in seven countries, and find that IT has no significant 
effect on both outcomes, discrediting the importance of IT in attaining even its most 
basic objectives. These sources, to name a few1, make it difficult to suggest a strong 
causal relationship between the implementation of IT and the reduction of inflation 
rates and volatility. 
Some empirical research looks beyond the obvious macroeconomic effects of 
an inflation-targeting regime and instead focuses on the effect of IT on output, output 
volatility and the sacrifice ratio (the cost of disinflation) when compared to other 
monetary policy regimes. This prompts an important discussion about the inherent 
tradeoff between inflation and output. Indeed, it is well established both theoretically 
and empirically that disinflations do not come without the cost of a subsequent 
reduction in output: this is the basis on which the concept of the sacrifice ratio is built. 
The sacrifice ratio is defined as the percentage loss in output relative to the percentage 
drop in inflation (Ball, 1993). For countries that wish to embark on disinflationary 
reforms to bring inflation down, the question then becomes what monetary regime 
 
1 (Dotsey, 2006; Rogoff, 2003; Walsh, 2009) also conclude that the effect of IT in 
bringing down inflation is questionable. 
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achieves disinflation at the lowest cost, i.e. with the lowest sacrifice ratio. In this 
regard, the empirical literature pertaining to how an IT regime compares to other 
regimes in terms of the cost of disinflation is quite divided. Corbo & Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2000) find that for five Latin American IT economies, the output sacrifice ratio and 
output volatility are reduced in the period following the adoption of inflation targeting 
when compared to the pre-IT period, and are either lower than or comparable to other 
non-inflation targeting industrialized economies. Consistent with this finding, 
Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) find that among a sample of OECD countries, those 
with IT regimes in place experience smaller sacrifice ratios than non-targeting 
economies during periods of disinflation. Debelle (1999) finds that in practice, IT 
regimes have proven flexible enough to allow for a lower degree of output variability 
than other monetary policy regimes.  
Brito and Bystedt (2010), on the other hand, find that the implementation of an 
IT regime has no impact on the cost of disinflation. Additionally, Cecchetti and 
Ehrmann (1999) find that across a sample of 23 countries, 9 of which are explicit 
inflation targeting economies, the inflation targeting countries suffer the highest 
output volatility. Roux and Hofstetter (2012) conclude that the effect of IT on the 
reduction of output sacrifice ratios depends on the length of the disinflationary 
process; IT adoption only reduces the sacrifice ratio when the disinflationary process 
is implemented gradually over a longer time period as a result of the credibility 
gained as a result of the Central Bank committing to an explicit target for inflation. 
However, in the event of an abrupt disinflation, IT countries experience higher 
sacrifice ratios. Thus, the literature on the effect of IT on output volatility and output 
sacrifice ratios seems inconclusive and subject to debate. 
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The divide on literature pertaining to the empirical macroeconomic outcomes 
of IT extends to the effect of IT on exchange rate volatility and the current account. 
Rose (2007) assesses panel data across 45 countries and concludes that the credibility 
gains associated with IT result in lower exchange rate volatility, less “sudden stops” 
in capital flows, with no negative effect on the current account balance. Sobrino 
(2010), however, critiques Rose’s approach, and contends that accounting for global 
economic shocks produces contradicting results, whereby IT is actually found to have 
negative impacts on the current account balances in 19 countries. Additionally, 
Edwards (2006) concludes that exchange rate volatility increases in three out of five 
IT countries studied as a result of these countries adopting a floating exchange rate 
regime to implement IT.  
Despite the fact that the empirical research on IT in the last two decades has 
been immense in quality and quantity, the effect of IT on macroeconomic 
performance is still not conclusive, and the literature has yet to establish a strong 
causality relationship between IT and macroeconomic performance, possibly pointing 
to the proposition that IT may not be a “one-size-fits-all” tool for bringing inflation 
under control. 
2.2.2 Empirical Literature on Linking the Satisfaction of IT Prerequisites to its 
Success 
The second part of the empirical literature on IT is concerned with the 
applicability of IT to developing and emerging market economies. The theoretical 
literature on IT stresses the importance of key “preconditions” that should be satisfied 
in order to guarantee the success of IT. A large body of literature has been dedicated 
to the investigation of the feasibility of IT in these countries where preconditions are 
lacking. In other words, this part of the empirical literature revolves around testing the 
degree to which satisfying the aforementioned prerequisites is indeed essential to 
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successful adoption and implementation of IT. Batini & Laxton (2006) argue that 
most emerging market economies do not satisfy all (or even most) of the prerequisites 
proposed in the theoretical framework, and hence, they represent a prolific ground on 
which the degree of necessity of meeting the theoretical preconditions can be 
investigated. This instigates a dialogue on how developing and emerging market 
economies differ in practice from developed ones in the context of IT. Mishkin (2000) 
cites high degrees of fiscal dominance as evidenced by a high incidence of 
seigniorage financing, lack of fiscal consolidation, shallow credit markets, unstable 
financial systems, and lacking technical capabilities, including difficulty in selecting 
an appropriate measure for inflation and modeling accurate forecasts for inflation, as 
major impediments to the successful implementation of IT in the emerging market 
context when compared to developed economies.  
Government dependence on seigniorage, a form of revenue that fiscal 
authorities collect as a result of their ability to influence monetary policy towards 
printing more money to finance government deficits, is a significant indicator of fiscal 
dominance. Debelle, Masson, Savastano, & Sharma (1998) found that developing 
countries rely on seigniorage revenues that account for an average of 1.4%-3% of 
GDP, which is significantly higher than the reliance on seigniorage in developed 
countries which averaged less than 1% of GDP during the same 16-year time span. 
Ismailov, Kakinaka and Miyamoto (2016) find that the tendency of less developed, 
low-income countries to have larger fiscal deficits and public debts makes them less 
likely to adopt IT regimes than high-income countries as a result of their 
governments’ constant reliance on central bank financing. Additionally, it has been 
shown historically that less developed countries are less capable of conducting fiscal 
adjustments in a sustainable way which in turn harms investment, with 30%-70% of 
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the decrease in fiscal expenditures being cut from spending on infrastructure in less 
developed countries, thereby questioning the viability of IT in these countries (Buffie 
& Atolia, 2016). 
Empirical research as also been extensively conducted to test one of the 
preconditions of a well-functioning IT regime in emerging economies: the proper and 
accurate understanding of the relationship between monetary policy tools and its 
ultimate goal, inflation. The vector autoregressive model (VAR) and Granger 
causality tests in the bivariate and multivariate forms have been used extensively in 
the literature to test the aforementioned relationship. In line with the methods 
undertaken by Gottschalk and Moore (2001), Tutar (2002) and, more recently, by 
Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), and more recently Mishra and Mishra (2010) and 
Odior (2012), this paper intends to use the VAR methodology and subsequent 
bivariate and multivariate Granger-causality tests to determine the strength of the 
relationship between monetary policy tools and inflation, taking into account the 
effects of other interrelated macroeconomic variables2. 
Some of the literature highlights the significant weight given to level of 
fulfillment of the prerequisites for IT in determining whether or not implementing 
countries will succeed. These sources tend to conclude that emerging markets where 
prerequisites are lacking could achieve better results by abiding by a more 
“conventional” monetary policy framework, such as exchange rate targeting 
(Eichengreen et al., 1999). For example, the World Economic Outlook of 2001 
suggests that absence of necessary institutional preconditions in general, and fiscal 
discipline in particular, in most developing economies will pose as a massive threat to 
the sustainability of IT success. Angeriz and Arestis (2007) also find that the lack of 
 
2 An in-depth review of the studies conducted using this methodology and their results 
are presented in Section 6.2 of this paper. 
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institutional and technical capabilities of emerging markets undermines their capacity 
to achieve success under IT. Carare and Stone (2006) employ empirical analysis that 
supports the notion that that emerging market economies wishing to transition into 
fully-fledged IT regimes should first work towards improving their fiscal position and 
the depth of the financial system in order to warrant the adoption of IT.  
Despite the anticipated challenges associated with adoption of IT in emerging 
market countries, thirteen out of 28 countries classified by the IMF officially as 
inflation targeting economies are developing/emerging market economies as of today. 
A study on IT in 21 countries shows that almost 80% of the emerging economies in 
the sample lacked the basic institutional and technical prerequisites proposed by the 
theoretical framework, but that this did not prevent them from reaping the economic 
benefits of IT. For example, Israel and the Philippines were characterized by high 
public debt/GDP ratios and sizeable government budget deficits at the time of IT 
adoption (Batini & Laxton, 2006). In another survey conducted by the IMF on 21 
inflation-targeting central banks, it was concluded that not a single country (including 
developed economies) had completely satisfied all the prerequisites at the time of 
adoption of IT (Batini & Kuttner, 2005).  
The theoretical notion that the pursuit of a successful IT regime automatically 
entails giving up any sort of control over the exchange rate has also been questioned 
by empirical data. A recent controversial IMF working paper strongly contradicts the 
theoretical literature and in fact that argues that proper management of the exchange 
rate actually enhances the results and efficacy of IT in less developed countries 
(Airaudo, Buffie, & Zanna, 2016). Building on the observation that foreign currency 
still carries significant weight as a supplier of liquidity services in less developed 
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countries, the authors concur that expectations of higher inflation can materialize in a 
self-fulfilling manner once capital flight triggers rapid depreciation of the currency. 
These empirical results point to a more neutral stance regarding the 
importance of fulfilling the preconditions of IT. One can argue that the prerequisites 
suggested in the theoretical framework should not be perceived as a rigid, stringent 
set of conditions that must be fully satisfied before central banks can even approach 
the prospect of IT adoption, rather, an amalgamation of circumstances that reduce the 
costs associated with adopting an IT regime, and bolster the possibility and speed of 
its success. For example, although the implementation of IT in Chile is considered to 
have been essential to getting inflation under control, the low degree of fulfillment of 
many of the necessary preconditions at the time of IT adoption resulted in Chile 
converging to stationary inflation levels only after 36 quarters, which is six times as 
long as the average time it takes developed economies to stabilize inflation levels 
(Khalid, 2005). Similarly, the Colombian experience with IT targeting can be 
regarded as a success in terms of macroeconomic performance today, but at the time 
of IT adoption, fiscal mismanagement and the overall lack of fulfillment of 
institutional prerequisites triggered one of the country’s longest recessions.  
Thus, central banks of emerging or developed economies that are considering 
a transition to an IT regime should not feel pressure to completely and fully satisfy all 
theoretical IT preconditions before adoption, but they should systematically assess the 
stance of the economy with regards to achieving these conditions, acknowledge them 
as important determinants of success, and subsequently work to make significant 
progress in the lacking areas during the introduction and implementation of an IT 
regime. 
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3. Recent Developments of Monetary Policy in Egypt 
For the purpose of analysis, this section divides the evolution of monetary policy 
in Egypt since 1990 till the present into four distinct phases. The end of one phase 
(and the start of the next) is determined by a major, relevant event that I find to be a 
defining incident in monetary policy evolution in Egypt. These four phases are: 
Phase One: The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) 
until the Transition to a Managed Float of the Exchange Rate (1990-2004) 
Phase Two: The Adoption of a New Monetary Policy in 2005 (2005-2011) 
Phase Three: The January 2011 Revolution Onwards (2011- 2016) 
Phase Four: Liberalization of the Exchange Rate Onwards (November 2016 – 
Present) 
Phase One: The ERSAP until the Transition to a Managed Float of the 
Exchange Rate (1990-2004) 
Prior to 1990, the Central Bank of Egypt set limits on bank borrowing and 
lending interest rates that were below the inflation rate during that period. This was 
representative of the overall subjugated nature of the banking system in Egypt at the 
time. In general, growth of money circulating in the economy was driven by the 
government’s needs for finance, and preferential borrowing rates were given to public 
firms and establishments (Handy, 2001).  
In the early 1990’s, in line with Egypt’s Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP), the Central Bank took steps towards reforming the 
banking sector and giving more weight to market forces in the distribution of credit 
and in the conduct of monetary policy. Direct credit ceilings that had previously been 
in place were gradually replaced with the development of indirect tools. The 
limitations on bank deposit and lending rates and on credit to the private sector were 
removed in 1991 (Moursi, Mossallamy, & Zakareya, 2007). Thus, the Central Bank 
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began a move towards the use of indirect monetary policy instruments for the conduct 
of monetary policy. Instead of directly limiting credit expansion in the banking sector, 
the Central Bank hosted weekly auctions of treasury bills with a maturity of three 
months (longer maturities were introduced subsequently). It thus managed liquidity 
growth indirectly through the purchase and sale of treasury bills. The reforms put in 
place under the ERSAP were successful in bringing inflation down from an annual 
average of over 20% between 1986 and 1992 to less than 10% by 1997. Inflation 
levels remained at single digits until the end of 2001 (Al-mashat, 2008). 
In spite of the progress made in the liberalization of the banking system and 
monetary policy during the ERSAP, there still remained the challenge of selection of 
a single, ultimate objective for the CBE, rather than multiple, often conflicting ones. 
Indeed, the period between the introduction of the ERSAP in 1990 and the float of the 
Egyptian pound in January 2003 was a period of obscurity in terms of the CBE’s 
objectives (Awad, 2005). At the time, the CBE was targeting high economic growth, 
while at the same time attempting to contain inflation with a pegged exchange rate, 
which presented a dilemma for the conduct of monetary policy (Awad, 2005). Growth 
of M2 was the intermediate target for the Central Bank, while its operational target 
was the excess reserves of banks up until 2005 (Abou El-Eyoun, 2003).  
In January of 2003, the CBE announced it would transition from a crawling 
peg exchange rate regime to a managed float. The decision was regarded as an 
attempt to relieve pressure on international reserves, and bring more consistency to 
monetary policy by allowing the exchange rate to be more flexible (Galal, 2003). 
With the first attempt to float the exchange rate in January 2003, the exchange rate 
pass through (ERPT) effects of the subsequent depreciation of the pound caused 
inflation to skyrocket once again, reaching a peak of 21.7% in early 2004. 
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Additionally, the CBE continued to cite exchange rate stability as one of the key 
objectives of monetary policy throughout 2004 and 2005 despite the official 
announcement to float the exchange rate (Awad, 2005). The volatility of excess 
reserves (Al-mashat, 2008), the inconsistency in monetary policy management and 
the existence of multiple targets for monetary policy were all factors in the Central 
Bank’s decision to transition towards a new monetary policy framework of IT in June 
2005. 
Phase Two: The Adoption of a New Monetary Policy in 2005 (2005-
2011) 
With the CBE’s announcement of its decision to transition towards an IT 
regime whenever the fundamental prerequisites were achieved, changes were made to 
the framework governing monetary policy in Egypt. Towards the ultimate objective 
of low and stable inflation, the intermediate target would be growth of money supply 
and the Central Bank would also monitor developments in the inflation forecast and 
domestic liquidity. The overnight interbank rate, which is a price target, would take 
the place of excess reserves (a quantitative target) as the CBE’s operational target. 
The Central Bank would set the overnight lending facility (the ceiling) and overnight 
deposit facility (the floor), which together form the overnight interbank corridor, 
within which the interbank rate fluctuates (Monetary Policy Department, 2015). As 
the effect of the devaluation of the pound started to wear off, and with the Central 
Bank’s attempts to contain inflation with tighter monetary policy, inflation levels fell 
during the second half of 2004 and throughout 2005 (Al-mashat, 2011).  
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Figure 1: Overnight Interbank and CBE Corridor Rates (2001-2010) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt 
Due to the second round effects of supply shocks due to oil subsidy cuts and 
the spread of bird flu, inflation picked up in 2006, increasing gradually from 9.6% in 
annual CPI in September 2006 to 12.4% in December 2006 to 12.8% in March 2007. 
As a result, the CBE continued its efforts towards achieving price stability leveraging 
the operational target of the overnight interbank rate, which was reflected in the 
MPC’s decision to raise the overnight lending and deposit rates by 0.5% in November 
and again by 0.25% in December 2006 to reach 8.50% and 10.50% in November and 
8.75% and 10.75% in December 2006 respectively. Inflationary pressures were eased 
as the annual CPI inflation rate declined to 8.5% in June 2007. During the same 
period, the CBE attempted to absorb excess liquidity in the market as a result of 
higher foreign direct investment flows by reactivating deposit auctions in January 
2007, and using its certificates of deposits (CDs) and notes.  
Inflation remained under control for the remainder of the financial year, and 
the CBE’s policy rates were stabilized accordingly. However, during the second 
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quarter of FY 2007/08, the CBE was faced with soaring inflation rates once again due 
to a surge in global food prices towards the end of 2007, an adjustment in subsidized 
oil and gas products, and accelerating economic growth. Annual CPI accelerated to 
reach 19.7% in May, 20.2% in June 2008 and 21.5% in September 2008. In 
anticipation of higher inflation expectations, the MPC made several subsequent 
decisions to increase the policy rate during the period between February and 
September 2008, bringing the overnight deposit and lending rates up to 11.5% and 
13.5% respectively by the end of September 2008. Furthermore, attempts to control 
excess liquidity were starting to pay off, with the annual growth in M2 decelerating to 
15.7% in 2007/2008, down from 18.3% in 2006/2007.  
Figure 2: Annual Growth in M1 and M2 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics 
Egypt’s economy was considered generally resilient to the effects of the global 
financial crisis during 2008, and by the end of the first half of 2009, inflation was 
brought down to single digits once again, reaching 9.9% in June 2009, down from 
20.2% during the same month one year before. The MPC thus decreased the CBE’s 
policy rate in an attempt to stimulate investment and growth once inflation was down 
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to moderate levels. At the same time, the width of the corridor was narrowed from 2% 
to 1.5%, bringing the overnight deposit and lending rates down to 9% and 10.5% 
respectively in June 2009.  Towards the end of the year, policy rates were lowered 
twice in simultaneous MPC meetings to reach 8.25% and 9.75% in September 2009. 
With the construction of a suitable price index being a core technical prerequisite of 
an IT framework, in October 2009, the CBE prepared a measure of core CPI that 
excluded regulated goods, and hence the impact of temporary price shocks on 
inflation. The purpose of this indicator was to provide a complementary indicator to 
headline CPI that would help to separate the core trend of inflation and its transitory 
movements, to depict a more accurate picture of the dynamics of inflation. 
In general, inflation remained manageable and stable from the second half of 
2009 until mid-2010, with an average headline CPI of 11.5%, prompting the CBE to 
stabilize policy rates throughout that period.  
Phase Three: The January 2011 Revolution Onwards (2011- 2016) 
In response to the economic instability that followed the events of January 
2011, and its impact on financial markets and liquidity, the CBE introduced weekly 
repo operations with a maturity of one week at an interest rate to be set on a regular 
basis by the MPC to address the liquidity crisis in the banking sector. The interest on 
7-day repo operations was first set at 9.25% annually, and then later increased to 
9.75% in November of the same year. While previous years had witnessed the 
weighted average overnight interbank rate consistently gravitating towards the deposit 
rate as a result of the excess liquidity in the banking sector, the beginning of 2011 
witnessed the interbank rate hovering towards the middle of the corridor in response 
to the liquidity crisis. 
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Annual headline CPI picked up to 11.8% in June 2011 up from 10.1% in June 
2010. Additionally the appreciation of the US dollar in relation to the Egyptian pound 
led to a rise in import costs. The political instability that shook the country earlier that 
year had led to local supply bottlenecks and shortages and weak demand, both of 
which contributed to expectations of higher inflation.  In November of 2011, the MPC 
increased the deposit and lending rates by 100 bps and 50 bps to reach 9.25% and 
10.25% respectively, thereby narrowing the width of the corridor once again to 1%. 
The decision to increase the key policy rates was backed by the MPC’s desire to 
hedge the aforementioned inflationary pressures.  
More efforts were made by the Board of Directors of the CBE in 2012 to 
address the lack of liquidity in the money market as the effects of the events of 2011 
continued to take their toll on the economy. These include reducing the required 
reserve ratio (RRR) from 14% to 12% in March (and later to 10% in May), and the 
introduction of repo operations with a maturity of 28 days in July. Eventually, the 
decisions taken by the CBE started to bear fruit, whereby the liquidity deficit in the 
banking system shrunk until it eventually turned into a surplus during the second half 
of 2012. 
During FY 2011/2012, the annual headline CPI (urban) moderated to 7.3% in 
June 2012, on the back of lower prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages. During 
the second half of 2013 and the first half of 2014, the MPC decided in three 
consecutive meetings to lower the overnight lending and deposit rates by a total of 
150 bps till they stabilized at 8.25% and 9.25% respectively. These rates were 
maintained until July 2014, but were then increased by 100 bps in response to the 
government’s revision of the prices of several regulated items in the CPI basket, 
which pushed inflation up. At this point, inflation was at a moderate level, with 
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headline CPI recording 8.2% in June 2014, however, the government’s overall fiscal 
consolidation effort carried an inflationary effect was inevitable, and the MPC thus 
embarked on a series of “preemptive rate hikes” to limit the associated inflationary 
effects. Additionally, to absorb the excess surge in liquidity in the banking sector, the 
CBE continued its bank deposit acceptance operations, using the seven-day deposit 
auctions that had been introduced in mid-2013. In December 2015, the MPC started 
the first of what would be a long series of consistent hikes in policy rates to contain 
inflation expectations in support of the government’s fiscal consolidation program. 
Thus, between December 2015 and June 2016, policy rates were increased by 3% to 
curb the continuous rise in both annual headline and core inflation, which had reached 
13.97% and 12.37% respectively by the end of June 2016. 
 
Figure 3: Overnight Interbank and CBE Corridor Rates (2011-2015) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Egypt 
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Phase Four: Liberalization of the Exchange Rate Onwards (November 
2016 – Present) 
The decision to liberalize the exchange rate on November 3rd 2016 was a 
critical one taken by the CBE amidst a broader reform agenda to restore 
macroeconomic stability to the country. Egypt initiated a new economic and structural 
reform program supported by the Extended Fund Facility from the IMF in November 
2016. The main objectives of the program include (1) eliminating foreign exchange 
shortages to encourage investment and exports, (2) developing a monetary policy 
framework aimed at getting inflation under control, (3) consolidating the fiscal deficit 
and ensuring sustainability of pubic debt, and (4) undergoing structural reforms that 
promote higher and more inclusive growth. The decision to float the pound was 
backed by the authorities’ plan to bring foreign exchange trade back to formal 
channels and away from the black market, and to improve the competitiveness of 
Egyptian exports and build up reserves while simultaneously reducing exports. 
Nonetheless, the exchange rate pass through (ERPT) effects, as well as the transitory 
effects of such a decision were expected to significantly take a toll on inflation rates, 
and so the MPC increased policy rates by 300 bps again in concurrence with the 
liberalization of the exchange right to reach 14.75% for the overnight deposit rate and 
15.75% for the overnight lending rate in November 2016. 
The prices of more than half of the items of the CPI basket were significantly 
impacted by the exchange rate reform measures in 2016. This transitory cost-push 
effect, along with inflation expectations linked to a history of inflation hovering 
around 10%, were the main drivers of the skyrocketing inflation that was registered 
towards the end of 2016, with headline and core CPI reaching 23.3% and 25.9% by 
the end of the year. Other factors included the introduction of the value-added tax 
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(VAT) at a higher rate than its predecessor (the general sales tax), and further fiscal 
consolidation measures including the gradual removal of subsidies on certain items. 
Figure 4: Exchange Rate vs. Inflation Evolution (2005-2018) 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, and Central Bank of Egypt 
Throughout 2017, the situation with regards to inflation was to deteriorate 
before it got better. By July of 2017, headline CPI had reached its peak of 33%. The 
MPC tightened its interest rate stance even further by raising policy rates another 700 
bps between the date the exchange rate was liberalized and July 2017, placing the 
overnight deposit rate at 18.75% and the overnight lending rate at 19.75%. Moreover, 
the CBE and the Ministry of Finance agreed to gradually phase out monetary 
financing of the fiscal deficit and abide by the legal limits to limit fiscal dominance. 
The CBE further tightened conditions via the introduction of flexible rate auctions to  
absorb excess liquidity over maturities greater than 7 days. 
 In March of 2017, the CBE also published its first “Monetary Policy Report”, 
a step that symbolized a commitment to enhanced transparency and communication 
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with the public in the conduct of monetary policy. The CBE announced its intention 
to publish the report on a quarterly basis. Additionally, in May 2017, the CBE 
announce an explicit inflation target of 13% (+/-3%) to be achieved by the fourth 
quarter of 2018. 
M2 growth (excluding revaluation) averaged 20.4% between November 2016 
and May 2017 compared to 15.9% between July and October 2016, owing largely to 
the positive contribution of net foreign assets to the banking system for the first time 
since 2011. To supplement these decisions, the CBE also took measures to sterilize 
excess liquidity by decelerating the growth of monetary aggregates, and particularly 
by targeting shorter-term maturity instruments. To that extent, the CBE was 
successful in reducing excess liquidity in maturities less than or equal to seven days 
from 3.5% of GDP in November 2016 to 0.6% in June 2017. The weighted average 
overnight interbank rate gravitated towards the ceiling of the corridor, reflecting these 
developments. 
Figure 5: Overnight Rates Since January 2016 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Egypt 
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Source: Central Bank of Egypt 
The following table depicts the weight of items in the CPI basket, as 
determined by the household income and expenditure survey of 2010 (January 2010 = 
100%), and trends in the prices of its components between June 2011 and June 2017. 
The largest percentage change was an increase of 160.8% in culture and recreation, 
followed by an increase of 152.8% and 150.6% for alcoholic beverages and tobacco, 
and food and non-alcoholic beverages respectively. Unsurprisingly, the smallest 
positive percentage change was in housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, due 
to the subsidies on many of these items that were only partially and gradually 
removed during the end of the period.  
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Figure 6: Headline and Core CPI (y/y) in Egypt 
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Table 1: Changes in Major CPI Component Prices 
  
Relative 
Weights 
  June 
2011 
  June 
2012 
  June 
2013 
  June 
2014 
  June 
2015 
  June 
2016 
  June 
2017 
% change 
2011 - 2017 
 All Items 100.0 114.5 122.8 134.8 145.9 162.5 185.2 240.3 109.9 
       Annual Growth Rate  11.8 7.2 9.8 8.2 11.4 14.0 29.8   
Food & Non- Alcoholic 
Beverages 
39.9 126.0 137.6 155.0 172.6 191.4 225.1 315.8 150.6 
       Annual Growth Rate  19.0 9.2 12.6 11.4 10.9 17.6 40.3   
Alcoholic Beverages, 
Tobacco & Narcotics 
2.2 169.9 201.8 217.4 235.2 314.6 320.8 429.5 152.8 
       Annual Growth Rate  69.9 18.8 7.7 8.2 33.8 2.0 33.9   
Clothing & Footwear 5.4 102.2 106.8 113.0 114.3 123.1 135.7 176.0 72.2 
       Annual Growth Rate  2.2 4.5 5.8 1.2 7.7 10.2 29.7   
Housing, Water, 
Electricity, Gas & Other 
Fuel 
18.4 100.4 107.7 113.1 117.1 124.2 130.8 140.9 40.3 
       Annual Growth Rate  1.1 7.3 5.0 3.5 6.1 5.3 7.7   
Furnishings, 
Household Equipment  
3.8 105.2 114.4 122.1 134.5 139.1 157.7 202.1 92.1 
       Annual Growth Rate  2.5 8.7 6.7 10.2 3.4 13.4 28.2   
Health 6.3 101.9 102.0 114.8 128.6 131.2 172.5 194.3 90.7 
       Annual Growth Rate  1.9 0.1 12.5 12.0 2.0 31.5 12.6   
Transport 5.7 101.7 104.5 107.3 114.2 139.2 144.2 181.6 78.6 
       Annual Growth Rate  1.1 2.8 2.7 6.4 21.9 3.6 25.9   
Communications 3.1 100.0 95.5 95.5 97.0 96.8 96.9 98.6 -1.4 
       Annual Growth Rate  0.1 -4.5 0.0 1.6 -0.2 0.1 1.8   
Culture & Recreation  2.4 108.4 117.8 126.7 145.3 168.1 190.6 282.7 160.8 
       Annual Growth Rate  5.9 8.7 7.6 14.7 15.7 13.4 48.3   
Education 4.6 124.3 136.6 152.2 157.9 196.9 219.0 246.0 97.9 
       Annual Growth Rate  24.3 9.9 11.4 3.7 24.7 11.2 12.3   
Restaurants& Hotels 4.4 112.4 116.5 141.7 148.7 177.5 215.4 268.2 138.6 
       Annual Growth Rate  12.2 3.6 21.6 4.9 19.4 21.4 24.5   
Miscellaneous 3.7 103.2 104.5 105.3 106.3 111.5 121.1 159.8 54.8 
       Annual Growth Rate  2.5 1.3 0.8 0.9 4.9 8.6 32.0   
Source: Central Bank of Egypt 
4. Testing for the Viability of an Inflation Targeting 
Regime in Egypt 
4.1 Methodology 
A thorough review of the theoretical literature and empirical studies on the 
applicability of inflation targeting provides a preliminary platform for the conduct of 
a feasibility study of the implementation of inflation targeting in Egypt. The study 
will attempt to tackle the question of whether or not inflation targeting should be 
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adopted by the CBE given the current circumstances based on an assessment of the 
institutional and technical framework currently in place in Egypt, and whether or not 
this framework adequately satisfies the basic preconditions for inflation targeting. To 
achieve this, this paper employs a twofold methodology divided into (1) the conduct 
of a comprehensive survey of country practices and experiences with IT and (2) an 
assessment of the Egyptian framework through a thorough review of the legislation 
and institutional framework and an empirical assessment of the strength of the 
relationship between monetary policy tools and inflation via a VAR methodology. 
• The comprehensive survey of the current international practices of 28 
countries classified by the IMF as “inflation targeters” will be used to 
identify the practical considerations that need to be taken into account if 
the CBE indeed decides to adopt an inflation targeting regime.  
• This survey will be complemented by a thorough review of Egyptian 
legislation, and the analysis of studies that have previously tackled the 
areas of interest in the Egyptian context based on past practices. In 
assessing the strength of the relationship between monetary policy tools 
and inflation, a VAR model and subsequent Granger-causality tests are 
employed. This analysis is extended to include impulse response functions 
(IRF) for monetary policy tools and inflation, and variance decomposition 
analysis. 
4.2 Survey of Country Practices 
The second part of my methodology involves carrying out a comprehensive 
survey of the international experiences in the implementation of IT. This survey 
covers the 28 countries that are currently classified by the IMF as fully-fledged 
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inflation targeting economies as of today. 3  The major outcome of this extensive 
review is a multi-dimensional summary table of inflation-targeting country practices 
that could serve as a convenient, easy-to-access tool for evaluating on a practical basis 
whether or not IT is suitable for Egypt, and where Egypt stands in the process of 
fulfilling the institutional and technical prerequisites for IT’s successful 
implementation. Data sources that have been utilized extensively are the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, the IMF Central Bank Legislation Database, and 
country Central Bank websites and publications. To better understand the outcomes, 
implementation challenges and considerations of inflation targeting in practice; the 
survey will be aimed at depicting a comprehensive picture that includes an attempt to 
answer the following questions: 
• How successful has inflation targeting been in terms of measurable 
macroeconomic outcomes? 
• What entity is responsible for setting the inflation target? Is it the government, 
the Central Bank, or is it set jointly? 
• How is the target defined? Is it a point or range target? If there is a range, how 
small or large is the width of the range?  
• What measure of inflation is used (headline CPI, core CPI, or another index 
altogether)? 
• What central bank accountability measures are in place? Are these 
accountability measures informally practiced or does the law mandate them? 
• Does the legal framework prohibit or set limitations on central bank financing 
of government deficit? 
 
3 The 28 countries are: New Zealand, Canada, Australia, UK, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, 
Czech Republic, Israel, Sweden, Guatemala, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, 
Colombia, Thailand, Iceland, Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Armenia, 
Albania, Ghana, Norway, Peru, and the Philippines. 
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The IMF lists 28 economies as official inflation targeters. In general, inflation-
targeting economies have been successful at driving inflation levels down, with the 
average difference between the five-year average inflation rate after and before 
implementation of IT being 10.28%. 4  The general trend also shows that these 
countries have been successful in maintaining low and stable inflation, with the latest 
inflation figures for most countries hovering around the five-year average after the 
adoption of IT, with very few exceptions. The following graph depicts the average 
inflation rates for inflation targeting economies in the five years before the adoption 
of IT, versus the average of the five years after the adoption of IT (including the year 
of adoption), and the latest inflation figures that were registered in 2016: 
 
4 Brazil was excluded from this calculation and the subsequent graph due to it being 
considered an outlier, with hyperinflation that averaged 721% in the five years before 
IT adoption. 
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Figure 7: IT Economies' Inflation Performance 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Additionally, a comparison between the average inflation rates of IT 
economies and those that do not have in place an official IT regime shows that 
inflation has been consistently lower in IT countries.  
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Figure 8: Average Inflation Rate of IT vs. Non-IT Economies 
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and data files. 
 
Given the observed relative success of IT economies in managing their 
ultimate goal of price stability, the logical next step would be to study individual 
country practices in the setup of the IT framework. This segment of the analysis will 
be particularly useful for studying the institutional framework, transparency and 
accountability measures that need to be set in place to guarantee the proper 
functioning of an IT regime. The amalgamation and analysis of experiences of other 
countries will provide an invaluable tool with which policymakers may base their 
planning of the upcoming transitional phase towards IT. Given the vast amount and 
complexity of the information gathered, I contemplated that the best way to present it 
in a clear and organized format would be through a comprehensive summary table.
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Comprehensive IT Country Practices Survey 
Table 2: Comprehensive IT Country Practices Survey 
Country Year of 
IT 
Adoption 
Current 
Target 
Institutional 
Responsibility 
for Setting the 
Target 
Accountability Measures Formal 
Requirement 
for 
Explanation 
of 
Deviations? 
Measure of 
Inflation 
Used 
Is price stability 
outlined as the 
sole/overriding 
objective in the 
law? 
Legal Framework Governing the 
Institutional Relationship 
between CB and Government 
1. Albania 2009 3% ± 1% 
 
The Central 
Bank - pursuant 
to article 161 of 
the Constitution 
of the Republic 
of Albania and  
Law No. 8269 
"On the Bank of 
Albania" (as 
amended).  
The Bank of Albania is legally obliged (as per 
Article 2 of Law No. 8269 "On the Bank of 
Albania") to report to the Assembly of the 
Republic of Albania on monetary policy issues 
twice a year. It should also give its opinion on 
economic developments every three months. 
The Bank of Albania sends its monetary policy 
and decisions to the public through the 
Monetary Policy Document, which describes 
the key principles of the Bank of Albania's 
monetary policy and the quarterly monetary 
policy report that analyzes the economic, 
monetary and financial developments that are 
expected to affect future inflation. It is required 
to convey its expectations to the public, and 
explain the implications of monetary policy 
decisions. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in: 
 
Law "On the Bank 
of Albania" 
Pursuant to Article 3 of Law No. 
8269 "On the Bank of Albania", 
the Bank of Albania may not grant 
any direct, indirect or any financial 
assistance to the Government of 
the Republic of Albania or to any 
of its Government agencies. 
However, the Bank of Albania 
may extend loans to the 
Government of the Republic of 
Albania with a maturity of six 
months. The loan amount shall not 
exceed the equivalent of 5% of the 
annual average income of the 
Government for the three financial 
years immediately preceding the 
loan approval. 
2.Armenia 2006 4% 
(±1.5%) 
The Central 
Bank jointly 
with the 
Government of 
Armenia - as 
stipulated by 
the Armenian 
Law on State 
Budget, and 
approved by the 
National 
Assembly of 
Armenia. 
On a monthly basis, the Central Bank publishes 
the Central Bank of Armenia bulletin, which 
includes individual decisions of the CBA’s 
voting members, as well as a statistical 
supplement and minutes of the CBA Governing 
Council meeting. 
The quarterly Inflation Report - which the Bank 
is legally required to publish, in accordance 
with Article 17 of the Republic of Armenia 
Law on the Central Bank - shows the state of 
implementation of monetary policy, 
developments in inflation in the previous 
quarter, domestic and external factors affecting 
it, and the extent to which inflation target was 
achieved. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in: 
 
Article 4 of the 
Republic of the  
Law on the Central 
Bank of Armenia 
In accordance with the law of the 
Republic of Armenia concerning 
the Central Bank, the Central Bank 
is prohibited from providing any 
direct or indirect credit or 
financing to the central 
Government or to other 
government bodies. 
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Country Year of 
IT 
Adoption 
Current 
Target 
Institutional 
Responsibility 
for Setting the 
Target 
Accountability Measures Formal 
Requirement 
for 
Explanation 
of 
Deviations? 
Measure of 
Inflation 
Used 
Is price stability 
outlined as the 
sole/overriding 
objective in the 
law? 
Legal Framework Governing the 
Institutional Relationship 
between CB and Government 
3.Australia 1993 Between 
2% and 
3%, on 
average, 
over time. 
 
The Reserve 
Bank of 
Australia jointly 
with the 
Australian 
Government – 
stipulated in an 
agreement 
between the 
RBA and the 
Australian 
government and 
published in the 
"Statement of 
Monetary 
Policy 
Management" 
The RBA releases statements in which each 
monetary policy decision is announced and 
explained, and provides minutes giving 
elaboration on the Council's policy 
deliberations. It also comments on and analyzes 
economic prospects through regular 
publications such as its quarterly Monetary 
Policy Statement and Annual Report which it is 
legally obliged to submit to the Treasurer as per 
the “Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act” of 2013, for presentation to 
the Parliament of Australia. 
In addition, the Governor reports twice a year 
to the Standing Committee on the Economy of 
the House of Representatives and to other 
parliamentary committees as appropriate.  
No Headline CPI Yes, in: 
Article 2, Section 
10 of  the Reserve 
Bank Act of 1959 
as amended.  
 
There is no legislation on 
restrictions on the provision of 
credit from the RBA to the 
government. 
4.Brazil 1999 For 2018: 
4.50% with 
a tolerance 
interval of 
1.50%5 
The National 
Monetary 
Council 
composed of 
the Minister of 
Finance, the 
Minister of 
Planning, and 
the Governor of 
the Central 
Bank. 
The Brazilian Central Bank publishes its 
Inflation Report quarterly, including charts and 
graphs depicting the quantitative forecasts of 
inflation and GDP, the schedule of future 
monetary policy meetings, and minutes of 
board meetings with a delay of less than one 
week. As per Decree 3088, if the inflation 
target is not met, the governor must submit an 
open letter to the finance minister on the 
reasons for the breach and the measures taken 
to restore inflation to the target and the time 
required.(“Inflation Targeting Regime in 
Brazil,” 2016) 
Yes IPCA (Broad 
National 
Consumer 
Price Index) 
Yes, in 
 
Decree No. 3088 
issued by the 
President of the 
Republic in 1999 
According to Article 164 of the  
Brazilian Constitution, the Central 
Bank is prohibited from granting 
loans, either directly or indirectly, 
to the National Treasury and to 
any body or agency that is not a 
financial institution. 
 
5 The target for 2019 is 4.25% ± 1.50%, and the target for 2020 is 4.00% ± 1.50%. 
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Country Year of 
IT 
Adoption 
Current 
Target 
Institutional 
Responsibility 
for Setting the 
Target 
Accountability Measures Formal 
Requirement 
for 
Explanation 
of 
Deviations? 
Measure of 
Inflation 
Used 
Is price stability 
outlined as the 
sole/overriding 
objective in the 
law? 
Legal Framework Governing the 
Institutional Relationship 
between CB and Government 
5.Canada 1991 2% 
midpoint of 
a target 
range of 
1% to 3% 
over the 
medium 
term.  
Jointly between 
Bank of Canada 
and the 
government, in 
a joint 
agreement 
between the 
Bank of Canada 
and the 
Government of 
Canada 
“Renewal of the 
Inflation-
Control Target - 
October 2016” 
The Monetary Policy Report is published 
quarterly, and indicates the Bank’s projections 
for inflation, in addition to the major risks that 
could cause inflation to deviate from its target. 
The “Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target” 
issued in May 2001, states that ‘If CPI inflation 
persistently deviates from the 2% target 
midpoint, the Bank will give special attention in 
its Monetary Policy Reports or Updates to 
explaining why inflation has deviated to such 
an extent from the target midpoint, what steps 
are being taken to ensure that inflation moves 
back to this midpoint, and when inflation is 
expected to return to the midpoint.’ 
Yes Total CPI 
 
 
Yes, in 
 
The joint 
agreement between 
the Bank of Canada 
and the 
Government of 
Canada of 1991 
 
According to Article 18 of the 
Bank of Canada Act, the Bank of 
Canada is allowed to “make loans 
or advances for periods not 
exceeding six months to the 
Government of Canada, but such 
loans outstanding at any one time 
shall not, in the case of the 
Government of Canada, exceed 
one-third of the estimated revenue 
of the Government of Canada for 
its fiscal year...and such loans shall 
be repaid before the end of the first 
quarter after the end of the fiscal 
year of the government that has 
contracted the loan” 
6.Chile 1999 3% ± 1% Central Bank 
 
Policy decisions are announced to the public 
immediately after the respective monetary 
policy meeting in an official news release. The 
central bank publishes the inflation report three 
times a year, announces the dates of the 
monthly monetary policy meeting six months in 
advance, and reveals the minutes of the 
meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee 
with a delay of three weeks. The Central Bank 
of Chile, pursuant to sections 78-80 of the 
Basic Constitutional Act on Central Bank of 
Chile, is required to submit an annual report 
evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy 
to the Minister of Finance and to the Senate and 
to make said report available to the public. 
 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Section 3 in Basic 
Constitutional Act 
on Bank of Chile  
According to Article 109 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of 
Chile 1980 and Section 27 of the 
Basic Constitutional Act on the 
Central Bank of Chile, the Central 
Bank may not act as a collateral or 
secure documents issued by the 
State, its bodies or institutions. 
The Central Bank is forbidden 
from providing credit through 
direct or indirect means to finance 
public expenditure or loans to the 
Government.  
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7.Colombia 1999 Between 
2% and 
4%, with 
3% as a 
specific 
goal 
The Board of 
Directors of the 
Central Bank of 
Colombia 6  in 
accordance with 
the Law of 
Congress No. 
31 of 1992 on 
the Bank of the 
Republic of 
Colombia 
In accordance with Law of Congress No. 31 of 
1992 on the Bank of the Republic of Colombia, 
the Board of Directors of the Bank of the 
Republic of Colombia reports twice a year to 
Congress on the performance and prospects of 
the economy. Monetary policy decisions are 
announced after Board meetings. This is done 
in a press release published on the website of 
the Bank of the Republic of Colombia. The 
inflation report, which is intended to give 
transparency to the Council's decisions, is 
published quarterly. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Decree No. 2520 of 
1993 concerning 
the Central Bank of 
Colombia, and 
Law of Congress 
No. 31 of 1992 on 
the Republic of 
Colombia 
According to the Constitution of 
1991 and its amendments, the 
Central Bank is prohibited from 
extending credit to the 
Government, except under 
“previously foreseen, special 
circumstances”. Under normal 
circumstances, the Bank can only 
extend credit to financial 
intermediaries that are 
experiencing temporary problems 
of liquidity or shortage of 
resources. 
8.Czech 
Republic 
1998 2% (with a 
tolerance 
band of ± 
1%) 
 
Central Bank 
(after reaching a 
consensus with 
the 
government) 
The Czech National Bank publishes quarterly 
inflation reports, explaining to the public its 
views on past and future economic and 
monetary developments, and on monetary 
policy decisions. The report also includes 
minutes of the board meeting of the Czech 
National Bank. Starting from 2001, the minutes 
have been expanded to include the votes on 
interest rate decisions by member name, as well 
as “Situation Reports on Economic and 
Monetary Developments”, which are described 
as the “main reference material for the Board’s 
monetary policy discussions”. (Czech National 
Bank, 2007) 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Article 98 of the 
Constitution of the 
Czech Republic 
and in Article 2 of 
Act No. 6/1993 
Coll., on the Czech 
National Bank 
 
In accordance with Article 34 of 
the Act on the Czech National 
Bank, the Czech National Bank is 
prohibited from offering overdraft 
facilities or any other type of credit 
facilities or from buying debt 
instruments directly from other 
European Union institutions, 
entities, central or regional 
governments, local authorities or 
other bodies governed by it Public 
Law. (Act No. 6 /1993, on the 
Czech National Bank, as amended, 
2017). 
 
6 It is worth mentioning that the Minister of Finance is the “presiding member” of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Colombia. 
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9.Ghana 2007 8% ± 2% Jointly by the 
Central Bank 
and the 
Government in 
the annual 
budget 
statement. 
Although minutes of MPC meetings are not 
published, the minutes of the press briefing are 
posted on the bank's website within a week of 
the MPC meeting. The World Economic 
Outlook, the External Sector Report, the 
Monetary and Financial Developments Report, 
the Financial Stability Report, the Real Sector 
Developments Report and the Inflation Forecast 
and Analysis Report are published. 
Although the bank is not legally bound to 
explain why the target inflation rate is not met, 
the Governor of the Bank of Ghana can be 
called to the Finance Committee of Parliament 
to explain developments within the economy 
when necessary. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Act on the Bank of 
Ghana (Act No. 
612) in 2002 
In accordance with the Bank of 
Ghana Act 2002, the Bank may 
provide advance loans to the 
Government for overdrafts and 
may directly purchase from the 
Government treasury bills and 
securities representing the 
Government's obligations. Loans, 
advances and purchase of treasury 
bills and securities with funds 
borrowed by the Government shall 
not exceed 10% of the total 
income of the fiscal year in which 
the advances were made. 
10.Guatemala 2005 4% ±1% Board of 
Directors of the 
Central Bank in 
accordance with 
the new 
Organic Law of 
the Bank of 
Guatemala, 
2002 
The new Central Bank Law states that its 
governor must appear twice a year to report to 
the Congress on the progress of monetary 
policy and the achievement (or lack thereof) of 
policy objectives. 
The Bank should also publish every six months 
a monetary policy report explaining the actions 
taken to achieve its objectives. 
The Central Bank should publish an annual 
study of monetary policy and the monetary 
program approved by the Board of Directors. 
The minutes of the Board involving the 
formulation of monetary policy must also be 
published. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Article 3 of the 
Decree Number 
16-2002 of the 
Congress of the 
Republic of 
Guatemala, 
Organic Law of the 
Bank of 
Guatemala. 
 
In accordance with Guatemala's 
Constitution, the Monetary 
Council may not authorize the 
Bank of Guatemala to grant direct 
or indirect financing, guarantees or 
approvals to the State or its 
decentralized or independent 
entities or to private entities not 
involved in the banking sector. 
Furthermore, the Bank of 
Guatemala cannot obtain securities 
issued or negotiated by these 
entities in the primary market. 
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11.Hungary 2001 
 
3 % ±1% 
 
The Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank 
(MNB), in 
accordance with 
Act on the 
Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank, 
20137 
Minutes of the MPC’s meetings are released 
before subsequent meetings take place, and the 
MPC issues a statement explaining the reasons 
behind its action on the day of the interest rate 
decision. Individual votes are also published. 
The MNB publishes its inflation report on a 
quarterly basis. The Bank’s performance in 
achieving the inflation target is assessed on an 
annual basis in the Annual Report and Financial 
Stability Report. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Article 3 of Act of 
2013 on MNB 
 
In accordance with the law of the 
Hungarian National Bank, the 
Bank may not extend overdraft 
facilities or any other type of credit 
facilities to, and may not purchase 
debt instruments directly from the 
public sector as defined in article 
123 of the Treaty on the Conduct 
of the Business of the European 
Union. 
12.Iceland  2001 2.5% Jointly by the 
Central Bank 
and the 
Government of 
Iceland in a  
joint 
declaration, in 
accordance with 
the law of the 
Central Bank of 
Iceland No. 36 
of 2001 
The Act on the Central Bank of mandates the 
publishing of the MPC meeting minutes with a 
formal explanation of the rationale behind them 
two weeks after each meeting. The minutes 
contain the members’ reasons for their votes. 
The individual votes of MPC members are 
made public in the Bank’s Annual Report. As 
per the Declaration of the Prime Minister and 
the Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland 
(2001), if inflation deflects its target by more 
than 1.5% in either direction, the bank must 
submit a public report to the government 
explaining why inflation has moved from the 
target, and the policy measures it is taking to 
deal with it, as well as the period that the MPC 
expects inflation to return to the target. The 
governors will also report to the Minister, 
Government and Parliamentary Committees on 
the Bank's policy. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Article 3 of Act on 
the Central Bank of 
Iceland 
 
 
According to Article 16 of the Act 
on the Central Bank, the Central 
Bank of Iceland may not grant 
credit to the National Treasury, 
municipalities or government 
institutions other than credit 
institutions. 
 
7 The target is set in agreement with the Government of Hungary, although the Hungarian law does not mandate this. 
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13.Indonesia 2005 3.5% ±1% 
for 2018 
Government 8  – 
as stipulated in 
a Memorandum 
of 
Understanding 
between the 
Government 
and Bank 
Indonesia and 
published by 
Decree of the 
Minister of 
Finance 
(KMK). 
 
Bank Indonesia regularly reports to the 
Indonesian Parliament on monetary policy as 
part of the Bank's accountability for performing 
the functions and functions guaranteed by law. 
Monetary policy is reported through written 
notes and verbal explanations of monetary 
policy every quarter, and specific aspects of 
monetary policy as it deems necessary. In 
addition, the policy accountability report is 
submitted to the Government and made 
available to the public for transparency and 
coordination. 
If inflation is not met during the year, the Bank 
of Indonesia will provide an open explanation 
of why the government and Bank of Indonesia's 
objectives have not been met jointly by the 
Indonesian parliament and the public. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
 Act No. 23 of 
1999 concerning 
Bank Indonesia 
The 1999 Law of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Bank Indonesia states 
that Bank Indonesia will not 
provide any credit to the 
Government and is prohibited 
from buying the State's debt. 
 
8 Before Act No. 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, the inflation target was set by Bank Indonesia. However, the Act stipulates that the inflation target is set by the Government in a move 
to strengthen the credibility of Bank Indonesia. 
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14.Israel 1997 Between 1-
3% 
Set by the 
Government of 
Israel (in 
consultation 
with the Bank 
of Israel 
Governor) – as 
stipulated by 
Article 3b of  
Bank of Israel 
Law of 2010 
According to Article 55 of the Bank of Israel 
Law, the Monetary Committee and the Finance 
Committee of the Bank of Israel shall submit at 
least twice a year a report on monetary policy. 
The report includes the policies that the MPC 
considers necessary to maintain price stability 
within the range set by the Government. 
Reports are issued one month after the end of 
each half-year. 
Also according to the law: “If the inflation rate 
deviates, during six consecutive months, from 
the range determined by the Government as per 
Section 3(b), said periodic report shall include 
details about the reasons for the deviation, the 
policy that the Committee has adopted to 
readjust the inflation rate to the determined 
range, and the Committee’s estimate of the 
period of time required for the attainment of 
this result”. 
Yes Headline CPI 
(Ribon, 2009) 
Yes 
 
Article 2 of Bank 
of Israel Law, 
5770-2010 
 
According to Chapter 8 of the 
Bank of Israel Law: “The Bank 
may not provide a loan to the 
Government to finance its 
expenditure. However, the Bank 
may provide the Government with 
a temporary advance to fill the 
temporary gaps in the 
Government's cash flow in 
implementing the budget, provided 
that the total provisional advances 
at any time does not exceed 1.6% 
of the total annual budget amounts 
at that time.” 
15.Mexico 2001 3% ± 1% Banco De 
Mexico – as 
stipulated by 
Banco De 
Mexico Law as 
amended  
Banco De Mexico publishes its quarterly 
Inflation Report, which analyzes inflation 
expectations, monetary policy, and future 
inflation risk balance. The Bank is required to 
report on its policies and activities to Congress. 
In line with this practice, the Bank of Mexico in 
January sends both the President and Congress 
a document setting out monetary policy to be 
followed for that year and a source of monetary 
policy implementation during the first half of 
this year. In addition, the Bank of Mexico sends 
to Congress a quarterly report on the evolution 
of Mexico's inflation and economy, as well as 
various domestic economic indicators. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Article 2 of Banco 
De Mexico Law 
 
In accordance with article 7 of the 
Banco De Mexico Law of 1993, 
the Bank of Mexico is entitled to 
grant credit to the Federal 
Government along with credit 
institutions. 
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16.New 
Zealand 
1990 Between 
1% - 3% 
over the 
medium 
term (with 
a focus on 
maintainin
g inflation 
near the 
2% target 
midpoint.) 
Jointly between 
the Minister of 
Finance and the 
Governor of the 
Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand 
(RBNZ) – as 
stipulated by 
the Law of the 
Reserve Bank 
of New 
Zealand, and 
published in the 
Policy Targets 
Agreement. 
The Law of the RBNZ states that the Bank shall 
publish the Monetary Policy Statement at least 
every six months; there shall be a select 
committee of the parliament whose task is to 
review the bank's monetary policy statement 
and to review the implementation of the 
monetary policy; that the non-executive 
members of the BoD of the RNBZ will be 
tasked with reviewing the performance of the 
governor in relation to the declared monetary 
policy, and submitting a report to the Minister 
of Finance, who may dismiss the Governor of 
the Central Bank in the event of failure to 
achieve the agreed upon inflation targets – even 
if only for one quarter. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Section 8 of the 
Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Act 
1989. 
There is no legislation on 
restrictions on the provision of 
credit from the central bank to the 
government 
17.Norway 2001 About 
2.5% over 
time. 
The 
Government of 
Norway - in 
accordance with 
the Royal 
Decree of 2001. 
The Bank of Norway is required by law to 
submit a monetary policy report three times a 
year with the announcement of the interest rate 
decision and to submit the annual report on the 
implementation of monetary policy. Whenever 
inflation is outside the target range, the central 
bank provides a comprehensive assessment in 
its annual report explaining the reasons behind 
the breakthrough and the next steps to reach the 
declared inflation target again. Special 
emphasis will be placed on any deviations 
greater than ± 1%. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in  
Ministry of 
Finance Letter of 
2001 on Monetary 
Policy Guidelines 
pursuant to section 
2 and section 4 of 
the Bank of 
Norway Act 1985. 
According to the Bank of Norway 
Act 1985, the bank may not 
provide credit directly or indirectly 
to the government. 
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18.Peru 2002 2%  ± 1% Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru 
(BRCP) 
The BCRP publishes an Inflation Report every 
four months. In addition to analyzing the recent 
evolution of inflation and the actions adopted 
by the Central Bank, as well as the Bank’s 
vision on the evolution of economic variables 
and on how they might influence on inflation’s 
future trend, it also examines the main factors 
that could deviate inflation one way or another. 
Monthly press releases on the monetary 
program for the month are usually based on the 
Inflation Report or refer to it. 
No Consumer 
Price Index 
for 
Metropolitan 
Lima 
 
Yes, in 
 
Article 2 of 
Organic Law of the 
Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru 
 
According to Article 77 of the 
Organic Law of the Central 
Reserve Bank of Peru, excluding 
securities in the secondary market 
issued by the Treasury, the Bank 
may not grant funding to the 
Treasury. It also prohibits the 
financing of state-owned 
promotional financial institutions. 
19.Philippines 2002 3٪ ± 1٪ 
over the 
medium 
term 
Government 
sets the target 
and it is 
approved by the 
Development 
Budget 
Coordination 
Committee 
(DBCC) 
through its 
Resolutions 
(most recently 
in 2015). 
The Inflation Report is published every three 
months. According to Section 40 of the New 
Central Bank Act, the Bangko Sentral must 
publish its annual report indicating the degree 
to which monetary policy objectives have been 
achieved and the underlying causes which will 
be submitted to the President and to Congress. 
When the inflation target is not met, an open 
letter is sent to the President and the general 
public that determines the reasons for not 
achieving the inflation target, and future actions 
to be taken to restore inflation to the target as 
set out in Section 63 of the new Central Bank 
Act 7653. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Republic Act: New 
Central Bank Act 
7653 
 
There is no legislation on 
restrictions on the provision of 
credit from the central bank to the 
government. 
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20.Poland 1998 2.5% ± 1% 
over the 
medium 
term 
Narodowy 
Bank Polski’s 
(NBP) 
Monetary 
Policy Council9 
- under Article 
12 of the Act on 
the NBP. 
Short-term inflation targets (one year) and 
medium-term targets (six years) are announced. 
The NBP publishes its inflation reports on a 
quarterly basis, which contain an assessment of 
inflationary processes and determinants of 
inflation, and elaboration of the monetary 
policy conduct during the last three months. 
The NBP also publishes the individual voting 
records of the members of the MPC. The 
MPC's decisions are published in press releases 
and accompanying press conferences, as well as 
the MPC minutes of meetings, the NBP’s 
monetary policy guidelines and the Monetary 
Policy Implementation Report. 
No Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
The Act on 
Narodowy 
Bank Polski of 29 
August 1997 
(Journal of Laws of 
2013, item 908, as 
amended) 
The NBP may provide credit to the 
Central Government by issuing 
securities in accordance with 
Article 49 of the National Bank of 
Poland Act. 
21.Romania 2005 2.5% ± 1% Jointly between 
the National 
Bank of 
Romania and 
the Government 
of Romania10 
The Inflation Report is published on a quarterly 
basis and it includes the following sections: 
Inflation developments; Economic 
developments; Monetary policy and financial 
developments; Inflation outlook, uncertainties 
and risks, implications on monetary stance. 
Developments in key statistical indicators are 
analyzed in detail in the monthly, semi-annual 
(Financial Stability Reports) and the annual 
reports.  
No Headline CPI Yes, in  
 
Article 2 of Law 
No. 312 in 2004 on 
the Statute of the 
National Bank of 
Romania 
Article 7 of Law 312 of 2004 
prohibits the National Bank of 
Romania from purchasing debt 
securities issued by the 
government in the primary market. 
The use of overdraft facilities or 
any other type of credit facility for 
the benefit of the Government is 
prohibited. 
 
9 Although the MPC constitutes one of the directing bodies of Narodowy Bank Polski as per Article 6 of the Act on NBP, the government is heavily representative in its composition. The MPC 
is comprised of the President of the Narodowy Bank Polski in addition to nine members selected by the President of the Republic of Poland, the Sejm and the Senate. 
10 As stated on the National Bank of Romania’s website. 
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22.Serbia 2008 3% ± 1.5% Jointly in 
cooperation 
between the 
National Bank 
of Serbia, and 
the Government 
in accordance 
with the 
“Agreement on 
Inflation 
Targeting” and 
“Memorandum 
on Inflation 
Targeting as 
Monetary 
Strategy”. 
 
The National Bank of Serbia publishes press 
releases from the meetings of the Executive 
Board on the same day when the meeting was 
held. Occasionally, the Governor appears in 
press conferences to elaborate on the rationale 
behind Executive Board’s decisions and 
answer any questions the public may have. A 
quarterly Inflation Report is published, and if 
inflation deviates from the set target for more 
than six consecutive months, the National 
Bank of Serbia is obliged to notify the 
Government about the reasons for the 
deviation, measures to be taken and the time 
needed for inflation to return to target level. 
 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in  
 
Article 3 of the  
Law of the 
National Bank of 
Serbia 
In accordance with the Law of the 
National Bank of Serbia, “the 
National Bank of Serbia may not 
approve credit, loans, overdraft 
facilities or any other form of 
credit facility to the Government 
of the Republic of Serbia, nor may 
it issue guarantees to settle the 
obligations of the Government or 
ensure the settlement of its 
obligations otherwise”. The 
National Bank of Serbia may not 
purchase securities issued directly 
by the Government 
23.South 
Africa 
2000 3%-6% Government - 
as per the 
Minister of 
Finance’s 
Medium Term 
Budget Policy 
Statement 
 
At the conclusion of every MPC meeting, an 
MPC statement is issued through a press 
conference by the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank of South Africa explaining the reasons for 
the MPC’s policy stance.   
The Bank also publishes its Monetary Policy 
Review (MPR) twice a year, which includes 
analysis of the domestic and international 
developments that have impacted on inflation, 
an assessment of the future outlook for the 
factors determining inflation as well as the 
Bank’s forecast of the future path of inflation. 
The Governor of the Bank is required to submit 
an annual report on the implementation of 
monetary policy to the Minister of Finance. The 
Governor also appears regularly in Parliament 
to explain the monetary policy stance adopted 
by the MPC. 
 
No CPI 
excluding 
cost of 
mortgages 
(CPIX) 
Yes, in 
 
Article 3 of South 
African Reserve 
Bank Act 1989 as 
amended) 
According to the South African 
Reserve Bank Act No. 90 of 1989, 
the Bank may grant loans and 
advances to the Government of the 
Republic. 
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24.South 
Korea 
2001 2% 
 
Bank of Korea 
in consultation 
with the 
Ministry of 
Strategy and 
Finance - based 
on Article 6, 
item 1 of the 
Bank of Korea 
Act 
The Bank of Korea publishes the Monetary 
Policy Report to the National Assembly four 
times a year to explain how to monetary policy 
was implemented towards achievement of the 
inflation target. If inflation deviates from the 
target by more than 0.5% in either direction for 
six consecutive months, the Bank of Korea will 
explain the reasons for the deviations, the 
projected amount of time, and the monetary 
policy strategy towards the return of inflation to 
the target, through the Governor's press 
conference. If adjustment of the inflation target 
becomes necessary, for example, in the case of 
unexpected local or international economic 
shocks, the Council will adjust the target in 
consultation with the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
 
The Bank of Korea 
Act of 1998 
In accordance with Article 75, the 
Bank of Korea “may extend 
overdrafts or another form of 
credits to the Government and 
accept government bonds directly 
from the Government.” provided 
that “the total amount of credits 
and directly accepted government 
bonds shall not exceed the debt 
limit decided by the National 
Assembly putting all debts 
together borne by the Government 
to financial institutions and the 
general public”. 
 
25. Sweden 1993 2% Sveriges 
Riksbank – in 
accordance with 
The Riksbank's 
Memorandum 
on the inflation 
target: 
clarification and 
appraisal 
 
Minutes of the Executive Board meetings on 
monetary policy are published including 
individual votes of members. Pursuant to 
Article 4 of Chapter 6 of the Riksbank Act, the 
bank compiles the report  “Account of 
Monetary Policy”, in conjunction with the 
evaluation of monetary policy, which is 
conducted by the Riksdag Committee on 
Finance on a biannual basis. . This describes 
how inflation and the real economy have 
developed over the past year.  
The Riksbank publishes its Monetary Policy 
Report six times a year. Within the report lie 
the executive board’s inflation expectations, 
monetary policy deliberations, and future 
inflation projections. Each report also contains 
a description of the new information received 
since the previous report and an assessment of 
how the Riksbank views the current economic 
situation. 
No CPIF (the 
CPI with a 
fixed interest 
rate) 
 
Yes, in 
 
Article 2 of 
Chapter 1 of the 
Sveriges Riksbank 
 Act of 2007 (The 
Sveriges Riksbank 
Act, 2016) 
According to Chapter 8 of the 
Riksbank Act of 2007, “the 
Riksbank shall not extend credit to 
or purchase debt instruments 
directly from the state, another 
public body or an institution of the 
European Union”. 
The Riksbank may, however, 
pursuant to Chapter 6, Article 7 
paragraph 2, “grant intraday credit 
to the state” and “may also grant 
credit to and purchase debt 
instruments from financial 
institutions owned by the state or 
another public body.” 
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26.Thailand 2000 2.5%± 
1.5% 
Jointly between 
the Government 
and with the 
Bank of 
Thailand - in 
accordance with 
the Law of the 
Bank of 
Thailand. 11 
The Bank of Thailand publishes quarterly 
Monetary Policy Reports to present the latest 
economic forecasts and developments on 
inflation, and to inform the public about the 
views of the MPC in reaching its monetary 
policy decisions. 
As stated in a mutual agreement between the 
MPC and the Minister of Finance: “If the 
inflation target is not met, the MPC should 
submit an open letter on why inflation deviated 
from the target, the policy measures it is taking 
to deal with it, as well as the period that the 
MPC expects to return Inflation to the target. 
The MPC should also report progress in policy 
actions to the Minister of Finance in due 
course”. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
New Bank of 
Thailand Law, 
2551 (2008) 
There is no legislation on 
restrictions on the provision of 
credit from the central bank to the 
government 
 
11 The Minister presents the agreed upon to the Council of Ministers for approval. 
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Country Year of 
IT 
Adoption 
Current 
Target 
Institutional 
Responsibility 
for Setting the 
Target 
Accountability Measures Formal 
Requirement 
for 
Explanation 
of 
Deviations? 
Measure of 
Inflation 
Used 
Is price stability 
outlined as the 
sole/overriding 
objective in the 
law? 
Legal Framework Governing the 
Institutional Relationship 
between CB and Government 
27.Turkey 2006 5% ± 2% Jointly between 
the Government 
and the Central 
Bank of Turkey 
– in accordance 
with Article 4 
of the Law on 
the Central 
Bank of Turkey 
 
Minutes of meetings of the MPC are issued 
within five working days following the 
meeting. The Inflation Outlook Report is 
published on a quarterly basis. If the inflation 
rate at the end of the year falls outside the range 
of 3% - 7%, the bank writes an open letter to 
the government as part of the accountability 
procedures as stipulated in Article 42 of the 
Central Bank Act. Furthermore, if quarterly 
inflation rates exceed the uncertainty level 
around the end-of-year target, the central bank 
will explain in the inflation reports the causes 
of the deviation and measures already taken, as 
well as those that will be taken in the future to 
achieve the target. 
In addition, the Governor appears semi-
annually in before the Council of Ministers and 
the Planning and Budget Committee of the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey to report 
on the activities of the Central Bank and the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
Yes Headline CPI Yes, in 
 
Article 4 of the 
Law on the Central 
Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey 
(As amended by 
Law No. 4651 of 
April 25, 2001) 
 
In accordance with the Central 
Bank of Turkey Law of 2008, the 
Bank may not grant advances and 
provide credit to the Treasury and 
public institutions. Debt 
instruments issued by the Treasury 
and public institutions may not be 
purchased in the primary market.  
28.United 
Kingdom 
1992 2% over 
the medium 
term 
The 
Government – 
as mandated by 
Article 12 of 
the Act on the 
Bank of 
England, 
announced 
through an 
annual letter 
from the 
Chancellor to 
the Bank of 
England 
(known as the 
“Remit for the 
MPC”) 
Minutes of the MPC meetings are published 
monthly with a two-week delay; the Bank's 
inflation report is prepared on a quarterly basis. 
These publications give insights into the 
analysis of the Bank's inflation expectations 
and the way this analysis affects the decision-
making process of the MPC. If the inflation 
target is breached by more than 1%, the 
Governor of the Bank of England should write 
an open letter to the Treasury Secretary 
explaining why the breach occurred and what 
the central bank intends to do to bring inflation 
back to the target. 
 
Yes CPI including 
housing costs 
(CPIH) 
 
Yes, in 
 
Article 11 of the  
Bank of England 
Act of 1998 
There is no legislation on 
restrictions on the provision of 
credit from the central bank to the 
government 
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Table 3: Main Findings of the Survey of Country Practices 
Institutional Responsibility for Setting the Inflation Target 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 28) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
Government 5 17.86% 
Central Bank 7 25% 
Jointly 16 57.14% 
Official Document Defining Institutional Responsibility for Setting the Inflation Target 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 28) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
Central Bank Law 17 60.71% 
Presidential/Congressional Decree 4 14.29% 
Other 7 25% 
The Institutional Relationship Between the Central Bank and the Government 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 28) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
The law prohibits the direct 
provision of credit or financing of 
the government by the Central 
Bank. 
16 57.14% 
The law places quantitative 
restrictions on the direct provision 
of credit or financing of the 
government by the Central Bank. 
5 17.86% 
There are no restrictions on the 
direct provision of credit or 
financing of the government by the 
Central Bank. 
7 25% 
Obligation of the Central Bank to Explain Deviations of Inflation from its Target 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 28) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
The central bank is legally obliged 
to address any deviations in 
inflation from the target 
12 42.85% 
The central bank is NOT legally 
obliged to address any deviations in 
inflation from the target 
16 57.14% 
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Definition of the Inflation Target 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 28) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
Point target 5 17.86% 
Range 6 21.43% 
Point target with a tolerance band 17 60.71% 
Bandwidth of the Target Range for Countries that Use a Range or Point Target with a 
Tolerance Interval (out of 23) 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 23) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
2 Percent 15 65.22% 
3 Percent 5 21.74% 
4 Percent 2 8.70% 
Measure of Inflation Used for Expression of the Inflation Target 
 Number of Countries 
(out of 28) 
Percentage of Countries 
 
Headline CPI 24 85.71% 
Core CPI 4 14.29% 
 
Analysis of Country Practices 
It was found that in approximately 57% of IT countries (16 out of 28 countries), the 
inflation target is set in a collaborative manner between the Central Bank and the 
Government. In these countries, the Central Bank has some degree of goal independence, 
and the degree to which the Central Bank can influence the inflation target varies from 
one country to another. This figure is reflective of the actual experiential practices that 
are observed in the country, regardless of whether or not they are backed by legislation. 
For instance, in Hungary the inflation target is set by the Central Bank only after a 
consensus is reached with the Government of Hungary, although the Hungarian law does 
not mandate this. In another 18% of countries (5 out of 28 countries), the government 
alone sets the inflation target without consulting the Central Bank. For these countries, 
the Central Bank has a minimal degree of goal independence. In total, 75% of IT 
countries’ governments are involved in the setting of the inflation target (either 
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independently or by coordination with the Central Bank). The common view shared 
among these countries is that the practice of involving the government in the process of 
setting the inflation targets delivers a high degree of accountability of the Central Bank to 
the government and to the public for achieving them. In Indonesia for example, 
legislation was passed to transfer the authority to set the inflation target from the Central 
Bank to the government in a move to “strengthen the credibility” of the Central Bank 
according to Bank Indonesia’s website. In the remaining 25% of countries (7 out of 28 
countries), the Central Bank has institutional responsibility for setting its own inflation 
targets. Central Banks in these countries possess a high degree of goal independence. 
In all countries, some form of official documentation is used to define institutional 
responsibility for setting the target. Around 61% of countries (17 out of 28 countries) 
have a clause or provision within the chief Law or Act governing the Central Bank that 
outlines the procedure by which the target is set and the institutional responsibility for 
setting it. A Presidential, or Congressional (or Royal, in the case of Norway) Decree is 
the official document in which institutional responsibility for setting the target is 
expressed for approximately 14% of countries. In the remaining 25% of countries, 
another form of official documentation is used. In Sweden, for example, there are two 
documents that delegate responsibility of setting the target to the National Bank of 
Serbia, namely the “Agreement between the National Bank of Serbia and the Republic of 
Serbia on Inflation Targeting” and the  “Memorandum of the National Bank of Serbia on 
Inflation Targeting as Monetary Strategy”.  
Often, central banks with inflation targets are directly accountable to the government 
or the parliament. Having the Central Bank Governor appear before Parliament, as well 
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as the legal obligation of the Central Bank to submit annual reports to relevant 
government officials are the principal means of accountability. For example, since the 
introduction of IT in New Zealand in 1990, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand is required to submit a biannual Monetary Policy Statement discussing the extent 
to which the central bank has achieved inflation targets announced over the past six 
months and the proposed monetary strategy for the next six months. This document and 
the procedure by which it is presented served as a platform for holding the central bank 
accountable, prompting other countries to follow a similar model. The publication of 
minutes of MPC meetings is another widely established means of guaranteeing increased 
transparency of Central Bank decision-making. In most countries (around 78%, or 22 out 
of 28 countries), the Central Bank is legally required to prepare and submit some form of 
documentation or report directly to the Government or Parliament on a regular basis 
explaining the developments in monetary policy and the strategy for the forthcoming 
period. In 11% of countries, the Central Bank is not bound by law to submit said 
documentation to the Government or to Parliament, but it is legally compelled to publish 
the decisions and results of monetary policy to the general public. Although, in practice, 
all 28 countries surveyed do produce a regular report dedicated to assessing inflation 
outcomes, prospects and projections for the reporting period, the remaining 11% of 
countries, are not formally required to do so by law.  
In 43% of the countries, there is a formal legal obligation (either a provision or article 
in the law governing the Central Bank itself, or in another law or decree), that states that 
the Central Bank is responsible for addressing any deviations away from the inflation 
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target to the Government and the general public, either in an open letter or in the periodic 
Inflation Report.  
Since IT necessitates that the Central Bank operate in the absence of fiscal 
dominance, my analysis on country practices includes a look into the legal framework 
governing the restrictions (or lack thereof) on political pressure on Central Bank to 
finance government deficits. As such, it was found that 57% of countries that have an IT 
framework in place have legal provisions that prohibit or interdict the direct provision of 
credit or financing of the Government by the Central Bank. In some cases, such as in 
Brazil, the emphasis on the prohibition of the Central Bank financing of Government 
deficit is so significant that it is spelt out in the Constitution, the highest or most supreme 
law of a country. Some countries allow the provision of credit to the government with 
certain quantitative restrictions. For example, in Canada, the Bank of Canada may extend 
loans or advances for periods not exceeding six months to the Government of Canada or 
the government of a province, provided that at any one time the existing loans do not 
exceed one third of the Government of Canada's estimated revenue for the fiscal year, or 
one quarter of estimated revenue in the case of provincial governments. These countries 
represent 18% of the total. On the other side of the spectrum, some countries such as New 
Zealand do not mention any restrictions on Government borrowing from the Central 
Bank; they represent 25% of the total. 
International experiences with IT also shed light on the operational framework of the 
IT regimes in different countries in terms of defining the inflation target itself. Some 
countries – 5 out of 28 - define the target as a specific level of inflation, or a point target 
(for example, 2%), others – 6 out of 28 - define it as a range (for example, between 1% 
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and 3%), but most countries -17 out of 28 - use a point target with a tolerance interval 
(for example 2% ± 1%). International experience has shown that the design of the target 
involves a tradeoff between flexibility and credibility (Dennis, 1997). Using a point target 
may provide credibility gains to the Central Bank since it implies more commitment 
committing to a specific inflation target but since it is virtually impossible to control 
inflation completely, consistent and significant deviation from the target could in fact 
undermine credibility. If the Central Bank in question does not use a point target, the 
same logic is applied to the bandwidth of the range or the tolerance band of the inflation 
target: the narrower the tolerance/range bandwidth, the higher the credibility gains of the 
Central Bank if it stays on target, and the more difficult it will be to achieve the target 
consistently without persistent deviations. Out of the 23 countries that use a range or a 
point target with a tolerance interval, 15 countries have targets with a bandwidth of 2%, 5 
countries have targets with a bandwidth of 3%, 2 countries (namely Ghana and Turkey) 
have targets with a bandwidth of 4%, while Australia is the only country with a target 
bandwidth of 1%. 
Almost 86% of countries (24 out of 28 countries) express their inflation target in 
terms of the year on year change in headline (total) CPI. Some of these countries, such as 
Korea, have only recently switched to using headline CPI. The remaining four countries 
use some form of underlying or core CPI as their target. For instance, South Africa 
employs the consumer price index excluding mortgage costs (CPIX). It should be noted, 
however, that all countries keep a close eye on measures of core or underlying inflation 
that exclude the most volatile items.  
4.3 Egypt’s De Jure and De Facto Institutional Framework 
 
 71 
Since Egypt initiated a new economic and structural reform program supported by 
the Extended Fund Facility from the IMF in November 2016, the search for a new 
nominal anchor has been underway. In this regard, the new objective seems to be a 
temporary switch to a monetary targeting regime in the short run, while moving towards 
the implementation of a full-fledged IT regime in the medium term. In order to achieve 
this objective, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), released a draft law indicating its desire 
to transition towards IT. Towards that end, a new draft law for the CBE amending the 
previous Law no. 88 of 2003 of the "Central Bank, Banking Sector and Monetary 
System" is currently under review. Although the draft law contains provisions which 
strengthen the operational independence of the CBE as the sole entity entitled to the 
autonomous conduct of monetary policy, it is lacking in terms of defining the 
mechanisms by which the CBE is held accountable for the achievement (or lack thereof) 
of its targets; a cornerstone of IT implementation and management. It is also unclear 
whether or not the government will have a role in the setting of the inflation target in 
coordination with the CBE.  
The independence of the CBE should be considered through the lens of both “de 
jure” independence, which is the legal independence that the CBE is formally granted in 
the Egyptian constitution and relevant laws, and also through the lens of “de facto” 
independence, which is what is observed in reality based on past practices. It should be 
noted that the two are not always one and the same, especially in developing countries, 
where law enforcement and the regulatory framework are not always as strong as they 
should be. 
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In terms of the legal framework, Article 10 of the “Law of The Central Bank, The 
Banking Sector And Money”, states that the governor of the CBE is selected by the 
President of Egypt upon nomination from the Prime Minister to serve for a four-year term 
subject to renewal. The governor then nominates two deputy governors who are also 
appointed by Presidential Decree for a four-year renewable term. The Board of Directors 
of the CBE, the responsible entity for the formulation and implementation of monetary 
policy decisions in the country, is made up of nine members, including the governor, his 
two deputies, the Chairman of the General Authority for Financial Supervision, a 
representative from the Ministry of Finance, and four “experienced” members in 
monetary and financial affairs, also selected by the President of the Republic and 
appointed by Presidential Decree as per the current law. In the proposed draft law, the 
composition of the BoD is same, except the number of members is changed from a total 
of nine, to a total of “up to eleven” members including “one or more Deputy Governors” 
as opposed to the clear specification of two Deputy Governors in the current law. What 
this means is that there is a degree of freedom in the new draft law for the Governor of 
the CBE to select one, two, three, or four deputies. The draft law does not provide 
justification as to why the number of members of the BoD was increased to a total of 
eleven, a high number compared to international standards. No clear specification of the 
number of Deputy Governors is also unnecessary and only complicates the organizational 
structure and clouds it with ambiguity.  
Another important pillar of the legal framework relevant to the discussion is the 
fact that the President of the Republic ultimately selects (or must approve) all voting 
members casts doubt on the legal independence of the CBE. Additionally, the relatively 
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short term of the Governor, as well as the fact that there is no clause granting immunity to 
the Governor from being fired, indicates that the legal framework puts the Governor of 
the central bank at a high risk of succumbing to political pressure. In one instance, Ali 
Negm who was appointed as CBE Governor in 1985 served a tenure of only 1 year, and 
was replaced by Mahmoud Hamed in 1986 immediately after a new Prime Minister was 
appointed (Kamaly & Farrag, 2007).  
Article 5 in the Central Bank Law of 2003, which maintained that the goals of 
monetary policy would be set in coordination between the CBE and the government 
through a “coordinating committee”, is replaced by Article 19 in the new draft law, in 
which this provision is deleted completely, thereby removing with it the legal framework 
governing the setting of the inflation target. This sparks an important discussion about 
whether or not the CBE should have full goal independence in addition to instrument 
independence. The notion that the CBE would be entitled to full instrument and goal 
independence without any accountability measures set in the context of a legal 
framework seems counterproductive and nonconductive to a well-functioning IT 
framework. Thus, it is suggested that, at least in the first stages of IT adoption, there 
should be cooperation and consensus between the CBE and the government in setting the 
inflation target and this cooperation should be formalized and integrated into the legal 
framework governing the institutional setup.  
The de facto level of independence of the CBE is also questionable. A study was 
conducted in 2007 using four indices, including one legal index and three behavioral 
indices (based on past practices), in order to measure the degree of independence of the 
CBE (Kamaly & Farrag, 2007).  The three behavioral indices included in the research are 
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the turnover of Central Bank Governor Index, which is hypothesized to be higher when 
Central Bank independence is lower, the Political Vulnerability of Central Bank 
Governors Index, and finally, a Questionnaire-Based Independence Index that is 
computed based on a survey of monetary and financial experts as an indication of their 
views on the observed independence of the central bank based on past practices. The 
general conclusion of the paper is that the degree of independence of the CBE based on 
the indices studied is relatively low, especially when compared to that of Latin American 
countries during the 1990’s, the same period during which a number of these Latin 
American countries adopted an IT regime. 
A low degree of fiscal dominance is crucial to the conduct of independent 
monetary policy, and in turn, a successful monetary policy regime. The legislative 
framework in Egypt does not have a clause that prevents the CBE from financing 
government deficits. In fact, Article 27 of the law on the CBE states that the CBE shall 
extend finance to the government, provided that said extension of finance to the 
government to cover seasonal deficits “shall not exceed 10% of the average revenues of 
the general budget in the three previous years. The term of said finance shall be three 
months renewable for other similar periods. It shall be settled in full within twelve 
months at most from the date of its extension”.   
Although there is no quantitative measure for fiscal dominance that is set-in-
stone, there is a general consensus that consistently high budget deficit to GDP, 
government debt to GDP, and net claims on government to GDP ratios are an indication 
of a high degree of fiscal dominance (Bank for International Settlements, 2012). When 
these ratios are constantly high, the government could resort to pressuring the central 
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bank to increase the money supply in order to finance its deficit, which has an 
inflationary impact on the economy.  
Figure 9: General Government Deficit (% of GDP)  
  
Source: IMF Data Mapper 
 
Egypt has registered unswervingly high rates of general government deficit as a 
percentage of GDP, with the ratio declining slowly only in the past three years. In 
comparison to the average for emerging market and developing countries and the average 
for the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt’s deficit to GDP ratio has been significantly 
larger. While progress is being made to slowly bring down the government deficit to 
GDP ratio, it is still worryingly high.  
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Figure 10: Net Claims on Central Government (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Comparing Egypt’s net claims on government to GDP ratio with that of lower 
middle-income countries, as well as that of Middle East and North Africa countries 
(excluding high income countries) shows that Egypt has had a significantly higher ratio 
on a consistent basis. This discrepancy between Egypt and the average of comparable 
economies has become even more apparent since 2010. The latest figures for 2016 show 
Egypt has a staggeringly high ratio of net claims on central government to GDP of 
around 70%, which is more than three times that of lower middle income countries’ 
average, and around two times that of the average of the Middle East and North Africa 
excluding high income countries. 
Past experiences have displayed the Egyptian government’s tendency to finance 
its deficit through financing from the Central Bank (Awad, 2008). Additionally, an 
empirical study that aimed at studying the de facto ability of the CBE to resist 
government pressure for deficit financing found that in practice, CBE succumbed to 
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political pressure and was unable to keep its money growth targets, indicating a high 
degree of fiscal dominance (Awad, 2010). It is thus suggested that there should be an 
official framework in place to curtail fiscal dominance. As demonstrated by international 
practices or experiences, efforts to achieve this can be embodied in legal provisions that 
prohibit or place limitations on CBE lending to the government and its entities or the 
monetization of government debts and deficits. 
Due to the intertwined nature of the effects of fiscal policy and monetary policy, 
fiscal consolidation by means of expenditure rationalization and tax system reform will 
strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy by minimizing the degree of fiscal 
dominance. The government has already made progress towards execution of an 
impressive fiscal consolidation program by undertaking steps such as the gradual phasing 
out of inefficient and poorly targeted energy subsidies, streamlining of the public wage 
bill, and augmenting tax revenues through the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT) 
in place of the general sales tax (GST) as well as tax administration reform. It is 
recommended that these efforts be further supported by widening the tax base through 
formalizing the informal sector, subjecting exempted items to the VAT, and by curtailing 
tax evasion. 
Egypt has made progress towards making price stability the primary, overarching 
objective of monetary policy. Al-Mashat (2011) previously employed a small open 
economy structural gap model to test the effect of varying degrees of exchange rate 
flexibility on inflation and output volatility under an IT regime in Egypt. In doing so, she 
found that higher exchange rate flexibility is associated with lower inflation and output 
volatility, and a smaller inflation/output sacrifice ratio. In coherence with Al-Mashat’s 
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findings, and as evidenced by the CBE’s recent decision to liberalize the Egyptian pound 
in November 2016, it is clear that the CBE is taking serious steps towards making price 
stability its sole target. This commitment to the superiority of the price stability objective 
is further evidenced by the CBE’s amendment of its objective from “overall financial 
stability in the context of the political and economic goals of the government” to “price 
stability” in the new draft law.  
In terms of technical capabilities, the CBE faces a dilemma in the selection of an 
appropriate index for inflation that is not uncommon amongst developing countries 
(Silver, 2006). In Egypt, the problem with headline CPI as an index for inflation is that it 
comprises all consumer goods and services, including subsidized goods and foodstuffs. 
Incorporating these two categories is problematic due to the highly volatile nature of their 
prices. Thus, the use of headline CPI as the measure of inflation will make it substantially 
more difficult to reliably forecast inflation and set realistic inflation targets, which could 
severely damage the credibility of the central bank (Youssef, 2007). The use of a core 
CPI measure that excludes these items, on the other hand, is also inapt because it does not 
depict a realistic picture of the level of prices due to the significant weight that the two 
aforementioned categories of goods have in the Egyptian consumer basket. Therefore, the 
CBE must work towards an appropriate measure of inflation if it is to adopt IT in the near 
future. In accordance with international practices, it is recommended that headline 
inflation be used for the inflation target itself, but that core inflation is closely and 
attentively monitored to enhance understanding of developments in the price level and 
guide policy making accordingly. Moreover, accurate inflation forecasting will command 
the timely availability of high-quality data and sophisticated forecasting models. Previous 
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work was done to assess the quality of data available in Egypt using the Data Quality 
Assessment Framework (Ghalwash, 2011). It was found that the quality of data in Egypt 
was subpar and insufficient to produce precise inflation forecasts, and that the areas in 
which the data was lacking the most were accuracy and reliability. 
Another important component towards assessing the ability of the CBE to forecast 
inflation to a suitable degree of accuracy will be to determine whether a strong and stable 
relationship can be established between monetary policy tools and inflation. This requires 
proper econometric analysis, and so a separate section in the paper is designated for the 
purpose of explaining in detail the sources of data used, the procedure undertaken, and 
the results obtained. 
4.4 Determining the Strength of the Relationship Between Monetary 
Policy Tools and Inflation in Egypt: A VAR Analysis 
 
The empirical analysis to come dissects one of the preconditions of a well-
functioning IT regime: the proper and accurate understanding of the relationship between 
monetary policy tools and the ultimate monetary policy goal of inflation. Inflation is 
measured as the consumer price index (CPI). The vector autoregressive model and 
Granger causality tests in the bivariate and multivariate forms have been used extensively 
in the literature to test the aforementioned relationship. In line with the methods 
undertaken by Gottschalk and Moore (2001), Tutar (2002) and, more recently, by 
Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), and more recently Mishra and Mishra (2010) and Odior 
(2012), this paper intends to use the VAR methodology and subsequent bivariate and 
multivariate Granger-causality tests to determine the strength of the relationship between 
monetary policy tools and inflation, taking into account the effects of other interrelated 
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macroeconomic variables. In general, VAR systems are often employed to forecast 
systems of interrelated time series, and to investigate the impact of random shocks on the 
system of variables. 
Table 4: Summary of Studies Testing the Feasibility of IT using VAR Models 
Author(s) Country Methodology Variables Used Results 
Aliyu and 
Englam (2009) 
Nigeria The authors employ 
the VAR 
methodology and then 
perform Granger 
causality tests to build 
a case for the 
adoption of IT in 
Nigeria. 
GDP, CPI, 
money supply, 
interest rates, 
fiscal spending 
and the 
exchange rate 
Results show that the link between 
prices and credit and interest rate 
channels were is weak and unstable. 
Additionally, evidence of strong 
inverse link between exchange rate 
and prices was found. This suggests 
exchange rate pass-through on the 
level of prices in the economy. The 
paper, therefore, recommends the 
pursuance of initial steps towards IT 
in Nigeria, rather than a fully-fledged 
IT regime. 
Bakradze and 
Billmeier 
(2007) 
Georgia The authors conduct 
an empirical 
exploration into the 
stability of the 
monetary 
transmission 
mechanism in 
Georgia using 
extensions to a 
baseline VAR model, 
Granger causality 
tests and variance 
decomposition 
analysis. 
Output (real 
GDP), the price 
level (CPI), a 
measure of 
liquidity 
(currency in 
circulation), the 
level of 
international 
reserves, and the 
nominal 
effective 
exchange rate. 
 
They find that IT would be a feasible 
option for Georgia in the medium 
term, pending the completion of 
institutional and operational reform of 
the Central Bank.  
 
Chinaemerem 
& Akujuobi 
(2012) 
Nigeria 
and 
Ghana 
The authors start with 
a two-variable VAR 
model incorporating 
money supply and 
price level, and work 
their way up to a five-
variable VAR system 
to study the effect of 
innovations in money 
supply on inflation in 
Ghana and Nigeria. 
Narrow money 
supply (M1), 
consumer price 
index (CPI), 
nominal 
exchange rate 
and the interest 
rates on 3 
months time 
deposit. 
They find that, even after including 
financial variables such as the 
exchange rate and interest rates, the 
model is not a statistically significant 
predictor of inflation outcomes in 
either country 
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Christoffersen, 
Slok and 
Wescott (1999) 
Poland The authors use a 
VAR methodology 
and subsequent 
Granger causality 
tests to analyze the 
statistical 
relationships between 
monetary policy 
instruments and 
numerous variants of 
inflation, such as 
headline inflation and 
underlying inflation. 
Monetary 
aggregates, 
interest rates, 
exchange rates, 
real activity 
variables, labor 
market 
variables, 
foreign price 
indices, and CPI. 
They find that the relationship 
between short-term interest rates and 
headline inflation is weak, and that it 
is slightly stronger for underlying 
inflation. They concur that in spite of 
the seemingly flaky linkage between 
policy rates and inflation, the linkage 
would become stronger and more 
predictable when the Polish economy 
completed its stabilization period.  
 
Gottschalk 
and Moore 
(2001) 
Poland Gottschalk and Moore 
utilize a VAR 
framework to analyze 
the effectiveness of 
an IT framework in 
Poland. 
The nominal 
effective 
exchange rate, 
and the three-
month treasury 
bill rate as 
policy variables, 
plus industrial 
production, 
nominal wages, 
and the CPI. 
 
They find that although the exchange 
rate served as the prevailing monetary 
policy instrument throughout the 
1990’s, the relationship between 
short-term interest rates and inflation 
was feeble in Poland. Rather than 
discarding IT on this premise 
altogether, the authors suggest 
modifying some elements in the IT 
strategy, such as widening the target 
range, to make it more applicable for 
Poland. 
Hoffimaister 
(1999) 
Korea Hoffimaister uses the 
VAR model in 
conjunction with 
impulse response 
analysis to determine 
the degree of 
predictability of 
inflation in Korea. 
Import prices, 
nominal 
exchange rate, 
broad money, 
corporate bond 
rate, CPI, output 
The author asserts that his empirical 
analysis supports the implementation 
of IT in Korea, building on the fact 
that the strength of the relationship 
between policy variables and inflation 
in Korea is similar to that of other 
advanced IT economies prior to the 
introduction of IT. 
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Mishra & 
Mishra (2010) 
India The paper analyzed 
the preconditions for 
inflation targeting in 
India and built sector 
specific 
Vector Auto-
regression (VAR) 
models to assess its 
suitability as a 
monetary policy 
framework for India. 
They  
 
Inflation 
(measured by a 
rate of change in 
wholesale price 
index), output 
gap, nominal 
effective 
exchange rate, 
monetary policy 
instrument, 
gross bank credit 
and broad 
monetary 
aggregate (M3).  
 
They find that external supply shocks 
and shocks in the exchange rate cause 
significant variation in inflation, and 
that they should be incorporated in the 
model for evaluation of monetary 
policy. 
 
Tutar (2002) Turkey The authors utilize a 
VAR framework to 
analyze the feasibility 
of an IT framework in 
Poland. 
Money supply 
(M1), CPI, 
nominal 
exchange rate, 
real gross 
domestic 
product (GDP), 
and the interest 
rates on 3 
months time 
deposits. 
 
The author’s results indicate that the 
statistical relationship between 
monetary policy instruments and 
inflation do not seem to be strong and 
predictable in the Turkish framework 
under the VAR methodology, and that 
inflation seems to be an inertial 
phenomenon 
Woglom 
(2000) 
South 
Africa 
To empirically assess 
the feasibility of IT in 
South Africa, 
Woglom employs a 
VAR methodology to 
study the dynamic 
relationship between 
monetary policy tools 
and the price level in 
South Africa.  
A monetary 
instrument, the 
price level as 
measured by the 
CPI, the level of 
real GDP, and 
the nominal 
exchange rate 
The study finds that an IT regime 
would not be effective for the South 
African economy, largely due to the 
fact that the relationship between 
monetary policy and inflation is not 
strong enough.  
 
 
Tarek Ghalwash (2011) adopts a methodology akin to the aforementioned 
literature to measure the strength of monetary policy tools on steering inflation outcomes 
in Egypt. He concludes that the baseline VAR and Granger-causality test results point to 
the fact that the relationship between policy variables and inflation in Egypt is neither 
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reliable nor predictable, leading him to advise against the implementation of IT in Egypt. 
This analysis builds on his findings, but nonetheless differs from his study in several 
ways. While Ghalwash employed annual data over a 12-year period, this analysis will 
include quarterly data from Q1 2005 till Q3 2017. This implies the data in this study 
includes the effects of the January 2011 revolution as well as the effects of the recent 
IMF-driven structural reform program, of which the November 2016 float of the 
exchange rate is a critical part. Additionally, this analysis will commence with a two-
variable model of M2 and CPI and develop gradually into a six-variable model in order to 
isolate the marginal effects of including other financial variables such as the exchange 
rate and government expenditure in the model.  
4.4.1 Model and Data Specification 
The analysis utilizes the VAR methodology and augments it with bivariate and 
multivariate Granger causality tests on the baseline VAR model. The baseline VAR 
model can be represented as follows: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐵(𝐿)𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
In the above reduced-form representation, 𝑋𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables, 
and 𝑍𝑡  is a vector of exogenous variables. The endogenous variables included in the 
vector 𝑋𝑡  are consumer price index (CPI), broad money (M2), the average overnight 
interbank rate (R), the nominal exchange rate (FX), government expenditure (Gvt) and 
the real GDP (GDP). The CBE’s operational target is set within the boundaries of the 
overnight lending and deposit rates corridor, and the exact rate determined by market 
forces within the corridor is the overnight interbank rate. Thus, the average overnight 
interbank rate was used as a proxy for interest rates since it best represents the monetary 
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policy stance of the CBE at a given point in time. All variables are included in their 
logarithmic form, except for the average overnight interbank rate, which is included as a 
level. 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝐼, 𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝑀2, 𝐹𝑋, 𝑅, 𝐺𝑣𝑡 
The data utilized for the conduction of this analysis is quarterly data from Q1 
2005 till Q3 2017 from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the CBE, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the World Bank. The statistical program being used is Stata 
13.0. 
4.4.2 Testing for Stationarity using Unit Root Test 
As per the literature, the unit root test is employed to first determine whether or 
not the variables are stationary. To be stationary, a time series needs to have a constant 
mean, variance, and autocovariance for each given lag. If the time series does not satisfy 
these conditions, it is categorized as non-stationary. For the purposes of my analysis, the 
variables must exhibit stationarity to ensure that the effect of shocks is gradually 
eliminated (shocks remain persistent in non-stationary series) (Brooks, 2008).  
Additionally, the results obtained by regressing non-stationary data can be misleading 
and ultimately valueless due to the phenomenon known as “spurious regression”, 
whereby the results of the regression suggest that two independent non-stationary 
variables exhibit a causality relationship when in fact, they do not. Thus, the Dickey-
Fuller test, the most prominent test for stationarity in the literature, is employed (A. 
Dickey & A. Fuller, 1979). One specific variation of the Dickey-Fuller test, namely, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test includes a constant and a trend. The null hypothesis for 
each variable in the series is that it has a unit root, or alternatively if the null hypothesis is 
rejected, the series is stationary at the selected level of significance. 
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Below is a summary table of the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test on 
all variables: 
Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Results 
 Level First Difference 
CPI 0.9990 0.0015** 
Interest 0.9991 0.0004** 
M2 0.9990 0.0000** 
Government Expenditure 0.5118 0.0000** 
GDP 0.8476 0.0000** 
Exchange rate 0.9986 0.0000** 
** denotes rejection at the 5% level 
 
The results show that we fail to reject the null unit-root hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level for all variables. To proceed with the analysis, the first difference of the 
variables is taken to conduct a second unit root. Taking the first difference and testing 
again for a second unit root results in the rejection of the null hypothesis for all variables. 
Now that all variables have been made stationary, the analysis may proceed. The graphs 
of the variables in their logarithmic forms (except for interest) and their first differences 
are presented below: 
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Figure 11: The Logarithm of the Broad Money 
Supply (M2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The First Difference of the Logarithm 
of Broad Money Supply (M2) 
 
 
Figure 13: The Logarithm of the CPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: The First Difference of the Logarithm 
of CPI 
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Figure 15: The Logarithm of the Government 
Expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The First Difference of the Logarithm 
of the Government Expenditure 
 
 
 
Figure 17: The Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The First Difference of the 
Interest Rate 
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Figure 19: The Logarithm of the GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: The First Difference of the Logarithm 
of the GDP 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: The Logarithm of the FX 
Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: The First Difference of the 
Logarithm of the FX Rate 
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4.4.3 Determining the Optimal Number of Lags 
 
The ADF test assumes that the time series follow an AR(p) process, where “p” 
lagged difference terms of the dependent variable y are included in the equation. 
Determining the optimal number of lags (p) is thus needed to run the VAR model. 
This can be done by employing a number of tests. The three most popular tests are 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion. 
Running lag order selection diagnostics was used to determine the optimal 
number of lags. The SBIC, HQIC and the Akaike’s information criterion all 
recommend four lags, which means we use this number of lags through the rest of the 
VAR analysis. As per the literature and given the relatively short time span covered 
by the data (eleven and a half years), a more thorough analysis involving long-run 
cointegrating relationships is not included in this paper.12 
Table 6: Selection-order Criteria 
Number of obs = 39 
lag df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 36 0.000 2.0e+23 70.6592 70.7511 70.9152 
1 36 0.000 2.3e+18 59.2614 59.9041 61.0529 
2 36 0.000 8.3e+17 58.1251 59.3189 61.4523 
3 36 0.000 2.7e+17 56.637 58.3817 61.4997 
4 36 0.000 2.2e+16 53.2377* 55.5334* 59.636* 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
12 Although a VEC model, which is more equipped to deal with cointegrating time 
series, was also run and is also included in the Appendix of this paper to check the 
robustness of the VAR results. 
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4.4.4 Results13 
 
A dependent variable is said to “Granger-cause” another independent variable 
if, given a specified set of past values of the second variable, the past values of the 
first variable assist in predicting values of the second. The null hypothesis for the 
Granger-causality test postulates that the time series of the variable X does not 
provide statistically significant information to predict the time series Y (in other 
words, X does not Granger-cause Y). The rejection of the null hypothesis at a certain 
significance level would imply the alternative that past values of X are indeed useful 
in the prediction of values of Y (in other words, X Granger-causes Y). 
The following analysis makes use of running the VAR methodology and 
running subsequent Granger-causality tests to determine whether or not the variables 
in question have a significant impact on CPI (and on GDP for the six-variable model). 
Making use of Tutar’s (2002) methodology, I start with two simple two variable 
model’s – CPI and M2, and CPI and interest rates- and gradually augment the model 
with one additional variable until I reach the final model, which includes all six 
variables. This methodology is especially useful in identifying the effect of 
complicating the model with one additional variable at each stage of analysis. The 
results are presented below: 
Two Variables: The Effect of M2 on CPI 
 
Effect on CPI Chi 2 P-value Remarks Conclusion 
M2 32.132 0.000** P-value is significant at all 
significance levels, we 
reject the null 
M2 Granger-
causes CPI 
Table 7: Two Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2 on CPI 
*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively 
 
 
13 The VAR model results are presented in the appendix of this paper. 
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Two Variables: The Effect  of R on CPI 
 
Effect on CPI Chi 2 P-value Remarks Conclusion 
R 16.792      0.000** P-value is significant at all 
significance levels, we 
reject the null 
Interest rate 
Granger-causes 
CPI 
Table 8: Two Variable VAR Results: The Effect of R on CPI 
*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively 
 
Three Variables: The Effect of M2 and R on CPI 
 
Effect on CPI Chi 2 P-value Remarks Conclusion 
M2 19.238 0.000** P-value is significant at all 
significance levels, we 
reject the null 
M2 Granger-
causes CPI 
Interest  6.366 0.041** P-value is significant at 
0.05 significance level, we 
reject the null 
Interest 
Granger-causes 
CPI 
Jointly 44.936 0.000** P-value is significant at all 
significance levels, we 
reject the null 
All variables 
jointly 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Table 9: Three Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2 and R on CPI 
*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively 
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Four Variables: The Effect of M2, R and FX on CPI 
 
Effect on CPI Chi 2 P-value Remarks Conclusion 
M2 5.0054 0.082* P-value is significant at 0.1 
significance level, we 
reject the null 
M2 Granger-
causes CPI 
R 5.6466 0.059* P-value is significant at 
0.05 significance level, we 
reject the null 
Interest 
Granger-causes 
CPI 
FX 1.1513 0.562 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null 
FX does not 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Jointly 44.936 0.000** P-value is significant at all 
significance levels, we 
reject the null 
All variables 
jointly 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Table 10: Four Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2, R and FX on CPI 
*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively 
 
Five Variables: The Effect of M2, R, FX and Gvt Expenditure on CPI 
 
Effect on CPI Chi 2 P-value Remarks Conclusion 
M2 2.7011 0.259 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null 
M2 does not 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
R 2.8664 0.239 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null 
Interest does 
not Granger-
cause CPI 
FX 1.8396 0.399 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null 
FX does not 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Gvt 
Expenditure 
0.50075 0.779 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null  
Gvt 
Expenditure 
does not 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Jointly 10.026 0.263 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null 
All variables 
do not jointly 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Table 11: Five Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2, R, FX and Gvt Expenditure on CPI 
*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively 
 
Six Variables: The Effect of M2, R, FX, Gvt Expenditure, and GDP on CPI  
 
Effect on CPI Chi 2 P-value Remarks Conclusion 
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M2 6.3453 0.042** P-value is significant at 
0.05 significance level, we 
reject the null 
M2 Granger-
causes CPI 
R 0.58833 0.745 P-value is insignificant at 
all significance levels, we 
fail to reject the null 
Interest does 
not Granger-
cause CPI 
FX 4.1727 0.063* P-value is significant at 
0.1 significance level, we 
reject the null 
FX Granger-
causes CPI 
Gvt 
Expenditure 
5.3137 0.070* P-value is significant at 
0.1 significance level, we 
reject the null 
 
Gvt 
Expenditure 
Granger-causes 
CPI 
GDP 8.8678 0.012** P-value is significant at 
0.05 significance level, we 
reject the null 
GDP Granger-
causes CPI 
Jointly 21.116 0.02** P-value is significant at 
0.05 significance level, we 
reject the null 
All variables 
jointly 
Granger-cause 
CPI 
Table 12: Six Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2, R, FX, Gvt Expenditure, and GDP on CPI 
*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively
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Impulse Response Graphs of Monetary Policy Tools14 
Figure 23: Impulse Response of CPI to CPI 
 
 
Figure 24: Impulse Response of CPI to Interest Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 The IRF graphs for remaining variables are presented in the appendix. 
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Figure 25: Impulse Response of CPI to M2 
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Variance Decomposition of CPI 
Table 13: Variance Decomposition of CPI 
Step dcpi dm2 dinterest dfx dgvt dgdp 
1 0.875962 0.018323 0.003374 0.041781 0.01366 0.0469 
2 0.730328 0.014022 0.036693 0.131836 0.033971 0.053149 
3 0.690343 0.041802 0.041121 0.114711 0.06625 0.045399 
4 0.626243 0.058081 0.039367 0.114755 0.078433 0.083121 
5 0.595803 0.04676 0.032262 0.099093 0.071958 0.154124 
6 0.543138 0.041092 0.029866 0.159708 0.078759 0.147437 
7 0.538591 0.041125 0.030083 0.159058 0.084897 0.146245 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
4.4.5 Discussion of the Results 
 
Starting with the two-variable model, both the average overnight interbank 
rate and M2 each separately have significant effects on CPI. Combining them both in 
the same model (the three-variable model) also produces the similar results. Once the 
exchange rate is added in the four-variable model, both M2 and the interest rate still 
have a significant effect on CPI at the 10% level, although their significance is 
weakened since they are no longer significant at the 5% level. The results of the 
bivariate tests of the six-variable model on CPI indicate that broad money supply 
(M2), government expenditure, exchange rate and GDP cause significant variation in 
the CPI at the 10% significance level. The results support the notion that the 
government’s financing needs are a significant driver of inflation, which could be an 
indication of fiscal dominance (although other factors, such as the sources of 
financing of government expenditure need to be taken into account in order to 
validate this claim). Similarly, the significance of the effect of the exchange rate on 
CPI points to the existence of a significant exchange rate pass through (ERPT) effect 
on the price level in the Egyptian economy. This was made clear with the 
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skyrocketing of inflation levels in concurrence with the floating of the Egyptian 
Pound in November 2016.  
One noteworthy observation is that the overnight interbank rate, which forms 
the operational target of the CBE, is the only variable that does not have a significant 
effect on CPI. This is especially concerning due to the fact that the overnight 
interbank rate had a significant Granger-causality effect at all significance levels on 
CPI when the two variable (CPI and Interest) and three variable (CPI, Interest and 
M2) Granger causality tests were run. This indicates that adding the FX and the 
Government Expenditure variables to the model caused the effect of the overnight 
interbank rate to weaken from significant to insignificant, further supporting the 
aforementioned claim that the presence of a high degree of fiscal dominance and a 
high ERPT effect dampen the strength of the relationship between the CBE’s 
operational target and its ultimate one. In general, the results point to the conclusion 
that although the relationship between the CBE’s intermediate target (M2) and its 
ultimate target (CPI) is significantly strong, the relationship between the operational 
target (overnight interbank rate) and the ultimate target is neither predictable nor 
reliable. This could be a significant impediment to the implementation of an IT 
regime since the monetary policy instruments do not have a sufficient impact on 
influencing inflation expectations.  
The results of the impulse response graphs are in line with those of the 
Granger causality tests. A positive shock in the interest rates generates a negative 
response in inflation, which mirrors the theoretical relationship between the two. 
However, the response generated by the shock in interest rates is not significant. This 
further bolsters the results of Granger causality test reported in table 13; that the 
relationship between the overnight interbank rate and inflation is neither strong nor 
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stable.  On the other hand, the impact of a shock in M2 on CPI is initially significant, 
and wears off gradually in successive lags. One additional finding relevant to the 
analysis is that inflation can be considered an inertial phenomenon in Egypt, that is, 
inflation in one period is a significant driver of inflation in the next period. The results 
of the variance decomposition indicate that in the first stage, CPI itself accounts for 
around 87.5% of the variation in CPI. This effect wears off gradually in successive 
stages. The effect of GDP, government spending, and the exchange rate on CPI on the 
other hand, intensify in subsequent stages. The shares of M2 and interest rates in the 
variance of CPI reach their highest level at the fourth and third stage respectively. 
Still, even at its peak, the interest rate accounts for only 4.11% of the variation in CPI, 
further corroborating the results of the Granger-causality tests and the IRF analysis. 
The deficiency of the statistical link between the interest rate as the CBE’s 
operational monetary policy tool and inflation is disconcerting, although unsurprising. 
Given the rise of both variables almost monotonically since the beginning of 2016, it 
would be natural to anticipate the difficulty for statistical tests to isolate the normal 
negative relationship that theory suggests should exist between the two variables. As 
economic reforms begin to reap their fruits and the economy begins to stabilize, it is 
likely that the statistical relationship between interest rates and inflation will 
strengthen over the medium term.  
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper was written with the purpose of answering the question of whether 
or not Egypt is ready for the implementation of IT. It employs a twofold methodology 
based on an assessment of the institutional and technical framework currently in place 
in Egypt, combined with a comprehensive survey of the current international practices 
of 28 inflation-targeting countries to determine whether or not the Egyptian 
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framework is adequate in meeting the basic preconditions for IT, and to identify the 
practical considerations that need to be taken into account if the CBE indeed decides 
to adopt an inflation targeting regime in the near future. The assessment of the 
institutional framework currently in place in Egypt involved a thorough review of 
both the current and proposed legislative framework governing the CBE, and an 
appraisal of the de facto observed institutional practices, while the relationship 
between monetary policy tools and the ultimate target of low inflation was assessed 
by employing a VAR model on data from Q1 2005 till Q3 2017, with subsequent 
Granger causality tests. 
 Through a thorough literature review, the advantages and disadvantages of IT 
in relation to its alternatives were analyzed, the basic technical and institutional 
prerequisites required for adoption of an IT regime were examined in detail, and the 
implications of IT for open, developing economies like Egypt were gauged. Egypt’s 
progress towards preparing the economy for IT adoption was evaluated exhaustively, 
and a thorough and comprehensive assessment of country experiences with IT to 
determine how an IT regime can be tailored to the specific case of Egypt and to 
provide policy recommendations regarding steps that can be taken to better prepare 
Egypt for IT in the near future. 
Given the overall success of the IT framework in the international context, the 
fact that that an IT framework has been in the works under the CBE’s agenda since 
2005, and the preparatory steps that have already been taken towards a fully fledged 
IT regime, the issue for Egypt should no longer be framed in terms of whether or not 
Egypt should transition to IT. The deliberations should instead revolve around when 
Egypt should move to IT and how the CBE should go about it. Whether countries 
wishing to adopt IT need to ensure full attainment of the theoretical prerequisites 
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before making the move to IT is debatable, but the fact that an IT regime is a 
demanding one in terms of institutional and technical requirements is nearly 
universally recognized.  
A survey of country practices and international experience with IT set the 
stage for benchmarking Egypt’s current position and pinpointing possible 
implementation challenges. The major takeaway from comparing the Egyptian 
framework with that of established IT countries is that Egypt’s institutional and legal 
framework is lacking in terms of defining the institutional responsibility for setting 
the inflation target, inclusion of legal provisions that prohibit central bank lending to 
the government, and formalizing central bank accountability measures in the 
legislation. Some practical issues also arise, such as the inherent tradeoff between 
credibility and flexibility in choosing the width of the tolerance band of the inflation 
target (or alternatively, selecting a point target). International practices also show that 
headline inflation is used as the measure of the inflation target in most countries, 
although all countries keep a close eye on measures of core or underlying inflation 
that exclude the most volatile items. 
Based on the results that emerged from surveying the Egyptian de jure and de 
facto institutional framework, it seems the current institutional setup in Egypt is not 
currently adequate for a fully-fledged IT regime. As noted, however, the lack of 
fulfillment of the aforementioned institutional preconditions undermines the 
successful conduct of monetary policy in general under any monetary regime and not 
just IT. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the importance of satisfying the 
preconditions is more pronounced under IT, as a result of its heavier reliance on the 
role of Central Bank transparency and credibility in the formulation of inflation 
expectations (Masson et al., 1997).  
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As mentioned, a new draft law for the CBE amending the previous Law no. 88 
of 2003 of the "Central Bank, Banking Sector and Monetary System" is currently 
under review. Although the draft law contains provisions which strengthen the 
operational independence of the CBE as the sole entity entitled to the autonomous 
conduct of monetary policy, it is lacking in terms of defining the mechanisms by 
which the CBE is held accountable for the achievement (or lack thereof) of its targets; 
a cornerstone of IT implementation and management. It is also unclear whether or not 
the government will have a role in the setting of the inflation target in coordination 
with the CBE. It is suggested that, at least in the first stages of IT adoption, there 
should be cooperation and consensus between the CBE and the government in setting 
the inflation target and this cooperation should be formalized and integrated into the 
legal framework governing the institutional setup.  
Additionally, there should be an official framework in place to curtail fiscal 
dominance. As demonstrated by international experiences, efforts to achieve this can 
be embodied in legal provisions that prohibit or place limitations on CBE lending to 
the government and its entities or the monetization of government debts and deficits. 
The IMF program that is currently ongoing already limits overdraft facilities by the 
government from the CBE and prevents the CBE from participating in the primary 
market for government securities. However, it is proposed that a complete formal 
legal prohibition of CBE lending to the government be introduced in order to 
strengthen credibility and free the CBE from any pressure to deviate its monetary 
policy stance to accommodate government financing needs. Due to the intertwined 
nature of the effects of fiscal policy and monetary policy, fiscal consolidation by 
means of expenditure rationalization and tax system reform will strengthen the 
effectiveness of monetary policy by minimizing the degree of fiscal dominance.  
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The CBE will need to streamline its policy objectives towards the ultimate 
goal of price stability and minimize its focus on other policy objectives such as the 
management of the exchange rate. The liberalization of the exchange rate in 
November 2016 is already a major step in that direction. It will be necessary to 
emphasize this by formally including a provision isolating price stability as the 
overriding objective of monetary policy within the legal framework. 
Reforming the Central Bank legislative and regulatory framework will be a 
fundamental step in the path towards making the institutional setting adequate for 
adoption of IT. The main takeaways from the analysis of the legal framework 
currently in place in Egypt, and benchmarking it against the international practices of 
other IT countries are as follows: 
• Price stability should be outlined as the overriding objective of monetary 
policy. It should be made clear that in the event of a conflict between price 
stability and other macroeconomic objectives, price stability should take 
precedence. 
• The CBE’s operational autonomy should continue to be emphasized and 
strengthened under any revisions of the current law. However, international 
experience has shown that, at least in the first phases of IT implementation, it 
is advisable to provide the CBE with instrument independence but not full 
goal independence. It has been shown that government involvement in setting 
the inflation target that the CBE is held accountable for achieving provides 
credibility gains that are desirable particularly in the IT initial adoption period. 
In all cases, the mechanism for setting the inflation target should be defined 
clearly in the legal framework governing the CBE. 
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• Prohibition of the monetary financing of government deficit should be 
included within the articles of the Law on the Central Bank. If a full forced 
ban of this practice is not possible, stricter limitations should be placed on 
government deficit financing. 
• The composition of the BoD of the Central Bank should be revised to ensure a 
clear and objective stance on monetary policy decision-making. Voting rights 
should be limited to non-governmental members of the MPC as a safeguard 
against fiscal dominance. 
• Transparency measures and procedures for holding the CBE accountable for 
the achievement of the inflation target should be instilled in the CBE law. 
These include the communication strategy for transferring information to the 
public, as well as the measures that would be taken in case inflation 
persistently deviates from the target. 
On the technical side, the results obtained from fitting a VAR model and 
performing subsequent Granger causality tests building from a two-variable model up 
to a six-variable model indicate that the relationship between short-term interest rates 
and inflation is not significant nor stable in Egypt. The fact that the overnight 
interbank rate had a significant Granger-causality effect at all significance levels on 
CPI when the two variable (CPI and Interest) and three variable (CPI, Interest and 
M2) Granger causality tests were run indicates that adding the FX and the 
Government Expenditure variables to the model caused the effect of the overnight 
interbank rate to weaken from significant to insignificant. This supports the claim that 
the presence of a high degree of fiscal dominance and a high ERPT effect dampen the 
strength of the relationship between the CBE’s operational target and its ultimate one. 
The deficiency of the statistical link between the interest rate as the CBE’s operational 
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monetary policy tool and inflation is disconcerting, although unsurprising. Given the 
rise of both variables almost monotonically since the beginning of 2016, it would be 
natural to anticipate the difficulty for statistical tests to isolate the normal negative 
relationship that theory suggests should exist between the two variables. Therefore, 
this paper is optimistic that as economic reforms begin to reap their fruits and the 
economy begins to stabilize, it is likely that the statistical relationship between 
interest rates and inflation will strengthen over the medium term.  
The CBE will need to select an appropriate index for inflation for the inflation 
target. It is recommended that headline inflation be used for the inflation target itself 
in accordance with international practices, but that core inflation is closely and 
attentively monitored to enhance understanding of developments in the price level and 
guide policy making accordingly. It is suggested that the CBE take steps towards 
improving its technical capabilities, including the quality of data, forecasting 
capabilities, and understanding of transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. It 
would be beneficial to leverage the IMF’s current support of Egypt’s economic 
reform program to acquire technical assistance from the IMF on these issues. Another 
critical component in building the technical proficiency of the CBE will be to develop 
a solid communication mechanism that bolsters the transparency of monetary policy. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of an IT regime largely relies on the degree of credibility of 
the central bank and ultimately the influence it has on inflation expectations, 
underscoring the importance of a communication strategy based on transparency and 
accountability of the central bank. The publishing of a “Monetary Policy Report” on a 
quarterly basis by the CBE is already a major step in this direction.  
What has been made clear throughout the analysis is that the transition to IT 
needs to be a gradual and sequential process, with the prioritization of the 
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development of the institutional setting the involved entities at the forefront of the 
transitional agenda. As evidenced by the experiences in the international context, 
Egypt faces significant challenges that make the transition to a fully-fledged IT 
regime in the near term problematic to say the least. The road towards a fully fledged 
IT regime is still a long, intricate and tedious one for Egypt especially considering the 
fact that the economy is still battling double-digit inflation and a persistently high 
budget deficit. Institutional and regulatory reform should be prioritized since these 
require sustained political commitment that takes time and to assemble and fortify.  
Nonetheless, and in line with the current overall economic reform agenda that 
Egypt has embarked on recently, taking steps that have been formally planned, 
prioritized and rationalized to prepare the economy for an IT regime will be desirable. 
In this regard, the CBE has already taken serious steps towards setting the stage for a 
formal IT regime, including the liberalization of the exchange rate, the announcement 
of a target for inflation by the end of 2018, embarking on an ambitious fiscal 
consolidation program, and the development and dissemination of an official 
“Monetary Policy Report” on a quarterly basis. Overall, this paper is optimistic about 
the ability of the CBE to overcome the aforementioned challenges towards a fully-
fledged IT regime in Egypt, provided sustained political commitment and proper 
prioritization and implementation of the transitional agenda continue to be realized. 
  
 106 
Appendix 
VAR Model Results 
 
Table 14: Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) Results 
 No. of Obs =38 R. sq = 0.6347   
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 95% CI 
dcpi      
L1 0.0421157 0.019947398 0.012 0.003218274 0.0812126 
L2 0.0713739 0.017042602 0.000 0.038140826 0.1047774 
L3 -0.0464113 0.018986888 0.015 -0.083435731 -0.009197 
L4 -0.0121003 0.017596837 0.492 -0.046414132 0.0223895 
dm2      
L1 0.9204492 0.170293744 0.000 0.5883764 1.252522 
L2 0.8146206 0.273376615 0.003 0.2815362 1.347705 
L3 0.8341559 0.279499385 0.000 0.2891321 1.3791797 
L4 -0.1845211 0.198010923 0.349 -0.5706425 0.2016002 
dinterest      
L1 -.0022995 .0084922 0.787 -.0189439 .014345 
L2 -.0031347 .0062371 0.615 -.0153592 .0090897 
L3 -.002695 .0054833 0.623   -.013442 .008052 
L4 .0128369 .0078186 0.101 -.0024872 .028161 
dfx      
L1 .1134664 .03546   0.001 .043966 .1829668 
L2 -.01959 .0397318 0.622   -.0974629 .0582828 
L3 .0821728 .0364149 0.024   .0108009 .1535447 
L4 -.0255005 .0391652 0.515   -.1022629 .0512619 
dgvt      
L1 .0112055 .0135356 0.408 -.0153238 .0377347 
L2 .0401185 .0200779 0.046 .0007666 .0794704 
L3 .0238942 .0189888   0.208 -.0133231 .0611115 
L4 .0186258 .0153889 0.226 -.0115358 .0487874 
dgdp      
L1 .0764243 .0801329 0.340 -.0806334 .2334819 
L2 .1954687 .0718473 0.007 .0546505 .3362869 
L3 .0250606 .0645761 0.698 -.1015063 .1516274 
L4 .1456081 .0643253 0.024 .0195329 .2716834 
      
cons .0527576 .0181577   0.004 .0171691 .0883461 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
  
 107 
 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model Results 
 
As per the literature and given the relatively short time span covered by the 
data (eleven and a half years), a more thorough analysis involving long-run 
cointegrating relationships was not included in this paper. In general, the presence of 
cointegration implies that there exists some form of linear combination of the time 
series of variables that produces a long-run relationship between them (Murray, 
1994). In other words, the presence of cointegration between non-stationary variables 
would imply the existence of a common stochastic non-stationary process underlying 
two or more of the variables. A VEC model is more equipped to deal with 
cointegrated nonstationary time series, since it has limitations on cointegration built 
into its specification; however, VAR models are preferred if no cointegration exists 
(Yamada & Toda, 1998). The general specification of the VEC model is based upon 
an autoregressive distributed lag model: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵0𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
where the parameter B0 denotes the short-run reaction of Yt after a change in 
Xt . The long-run effect is given when the model is in equilibrium where: Y* = α + 
βX*. The error correction model (ECM) is then shown as: 
∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝐵1∆𝑋𝑡 − Π(𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛼 − 𝐵𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡 
∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝐵1∆𝑋𝑡 − Π𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
where Π = (1 − 𝐴0) 
B = (𝐵1 + 𝐵0)/ (1 − 𝐴0) 
The two variables 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are cointegrated and ECM incorporates the short-run and 
long run effects. This is because the long-run equilibrium (𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛼 − 𝐵𝑋𝑡−1)  is 
included in the model together with the short-run dynamics captured by the 
differenced term. 
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To confirm the robustness of the results obtained from the VAR model, a VEC 
model was also run on the data to compare the results. The results of the VEC model 
are presented below: 
Table 15: VEC Model Results 
Effect on CPI Coefficient Standard 
Error 
P>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
d.CPI      
LD. .5407824 .2216468 0.015 .1063626 .9752021 
L2D. .6371643 .1691856 0.000 .3055666 .968762 
L3D. .4256421 .1750348 0.015 .0825802 .7687039 
d.interest      
LD. .0371026 .0633409 0.558 -.0870432 .1612485 
L2D. -.1796681 .0659737 0.612 -.3089742 -.0503621 
L3D. -.0210991 .0659377 0.749 -.1503347 .1081365 
d.m2      
LD. -10.5102 3.222182 0.001 -16.82557 -4.194842 
L2D. -8.131317 3.332772 0.015 -14.66343 -1.599204 
L3D. 1.759916 2.869333 0.540 -3.863874 7.383707 
d.fx      
LD. 5.455801 1.805757 0.003 1.916582 8.99502 
L2D. 3.959595 1.990208 0.047 .0588593 7.86033 
L3D. 3.288029 1.858352 0.077 -.3542729 6.930331 
d.gvt      
LD. .6209773 .1761646 0.000 .275701 .9662535 
L2D. .3752333 .1889771 0.047 .0048451 .7456216 
 109 
L3D. -.0159461 .1406153 0.910 -.291547 .2596549 
d.GDP      
LD. -1.097554 .7945769 0.167 -2.654897 .4597876 
L2D. -.2301298 .5581327 0.680 -1.32405 .8637902 
L3D. .3216705 .6845124 0.638 -1.019949 1.66329 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
The results of the VECM are consistent with those of the six-variable VAR 
model. It is found that the interest rate does not significantly affect CPI at all 
significance levels and at all lag orders. M2 is significant at the 5% at the first and 
second lag, although it becomes insignificant after the second lag. The same is true 
for government expenditure and the exchange rate. It is also found that lagged values 
of CPI have a significant effect on current CPI at the 5% level. This indicates that 
inflation is an inertial phenomenon in Egypt, driven by expectations of inflation based 
on historical inflation rates. Overall, the VECM results corroborate the robustness of 
the VAR model results. 
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Impulse Response Graphs 
 
Figure 26: Impulse Response of CPI to GDP 
 
Figure 27: Impulse Response of CPI to FX 
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Figure 28: Impulse Response of CPI to Government Expenditure 
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